Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany

Isabel Hull, in her tome Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany, analyzes German military culture and policy from the German Wars of Unification (1866-1871) to the final year of the Great War (1918). She contends that an isolated German military culture emerged as the chief directorate of German foreign policy (Weltpolitik). The German state and society, forged in war, came to adulate the military apparatus as a conveyer of strength and patriotism in Europe during the late 19th century. Fin-de-siècle Europe found itself immersed in social Darwinist ideology as well as global imperial competition and militarism. However, as Hull makes clear, Germany was different. Germany came to be dominated by its military institution rather than civilian institutions. It is also important to note that the German military was not ideologically driven (as it was during the era of the Third Reich). Rather, Germany was driven by a military culture that internalized "habitual practices, default programs, hidden assumptions, and unreflected [sic] cognitive frames" that created illogical and irrational war aims and practices (2). Moreover, the military was, itself, isolated from criticism due to the Bismarck constitution, which restricted the Reichstag's ability to control the military, the creation of a powerful Kaiser, and an accommodating public (militarist and "patriotic" pressure groups) and press. The German military, thus, became entrapped in its own "solipsistic" groupthink, approving of its own policies (including the complete "annihilation" of the enemy as the only form of victory), which eventually led to the Kaiserreich's demise by 1918.Hull uses the German colony in Southwest Africa (SWA) during the early 1900's as an example of brutal tactics utilized by the German war machine. The General Staff was given nearly complete control of orchestrating policy in SWA by the Kaiser. The "Wilhelminian government was not integrated under civilian leadership" (12). Rather, Kaiser Wilhelm II had the authority to appoint the apparatus of his choosing to implement policy in the colony. Because the Herero revolt was considered one of "national security," Wilhelm chose the General Staff. Moreover, the constitution allowed for the Kaiser to fund the army without Reichstag approval. Thus, the colony fell under the auspices of German military doctrine rather than civilian doctrine. Military patrols lacked government oversight, leaving generals and subordinate commanders in charge of implementing policy on the ground. Courts-martial and the arbitrary shooting of civilians suspected of practicing guerrilla warfare ("francs-tireurs") were, therefore, carried out by the military apparatus. Because the military identified "the entire people" in SWA as enemy combatants, all were susceptible to execution. Executions were "not random atrocities but accepted methods of warfare" preached in German military doctrine (20). This brutal approach regarding civilians was implemented previously during the Franco-Prussian War, "the first German 'national' war," which generated and "galvanized" German military doctrine and later in Belgium and France during WWI (110). Because this policy of annihilation seemed to "work" in SWA, the military leadership convinced itself that it was indeed the correct tactic for military victory.How did a policy of killing civilians in warfare become part of German military doctrine? Hull utilizes a sociological approach, arguing that such a policy became protocol as a result of "trauma-learning" from the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War. The Franco-Prussian War was, in a sense, Germany's war of revolution. The autonomy of a future unified German state "hung in the balance" (117). Because the French did not surrender after the massive battle of Sedan, in which the enemy was "annihilated," a core precept of German-Clauswitzian military doctrine, the General Staff could not see how to clearly end the war. Civilians, Hull contends, became the enemy because many committed to guerrilla warfare. The General Staff came to the conclusion, out of irrational fear, that annihilating civilian populations was a fundamental condition for victory. Thus, despite international prohibitions against killing civilians, the German army trained its burgeoning officer corps to essentially disregard such regulations. Hull compares this policy to the British policy in South Africa during the Boer War in which the British Army, constrained by a powerful Parliament and press, was kept from committing such atrocities against civilians through civilian oversight.The General Staff's policy of annihilation led it to create irrational and impractical military strategies such as the Schlieffen Plan, which eventually led to disastrous results for the German war machine in the first two years of the Great War. The German military entered WWI with no real goals other than the total annihilation of the enemy, which consisted of countries with much larger armies and populations (Russia, France and, later, Britain). By 1917, WWI had become a war of attrition, for which the German military had no supplies or manpower. A nation forged in war was destroyed by war.

Despite the accolades from many reviewers, I would offer a completely opposite reaction. The theories espoused by the author do not make sense; while her research is commendable, her conclusions which are derived from such research are unsupportable.As early as the preface (page 2), she criticizes Wilhemine Germany for its dysfunctional extremes of violence, which includes prescriptions for correct fighting (i.e., offensive, concentration of force, etc.). These are the same principles of war espoused by the contemporary United States Army (cf. FM 3-0). Similarly, the criticism of "the demand for unconditional surrender" (page 100) could also be leveled at the US Army."The military was also the foremost instrument of national integration" (p. 108). Yet, this was also true of the American Army in World Wars I and II, and I would suggest that the leavening process of military basic training does indeed force one to shift his views -- something which I am sure the author never experienced. Is national integration something to be avoided?"Only actual fighting was deemed important" (page 139) and logistics suffered as a result. Yet, the AEF during World War I concentrated on bringing over infantry and machine gunners -- much to the detriment of the logistical tail. Also, while professional officers recognize the importance of logistics, the logisticians often suffer a slowness in promotability when compared with operations officers."The Schlieffen plan was purely military... Foreign policy, economics and domestic policy played no role in it" (page 166). Yet, any military plan would not cover these areas since they are within the purview of the civilian sector.The "cult of the offensive ... was nowhere more assiduously cultivated or more thoroughly adapted than in Germany." (page 167) But what of French military theory, beginning with Ardant duPicq, and modified by Georges Gilbert, Louis Loyzeau de Grandmaison, and Ferdinand Foch?When the author covers the German campaign and genocide in SWA (Southwest Africa), she mentions (in passing), a young captain -- Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, who presumably would have learned the German culture therein. However, nowhere does she mention his later career during World War I, where he led one of the most brilliant guerilla campaigns in history in German East Africa, and without any allegations of genocide or crimes against humanity -- and most of his troops were indigenous Schutztruppen.The author tries to link the Armenian genocide with the German proclivity for such activity, but fails to do so in a coherent fashion.While she does contrast the British war against the Boers with the German war against the Hereros, nowhere does she mention the colonial practices of the French, Belgians or Portuguese -- the latter two who may have been the poster children for despicable conduct in colonial administrations.Finally, I would note the author's CV -- "She specializes in German history from 1700 to 1945, with a focus on sociopolitics, political theory, and gender/sexuality" --none of which suggests a capability of understanding the military gestalt. The book's conclusions are as overreaching as the text is pedantic.

This is a study of institutional extremism. It examines the German conduct of war from 1870 through 1918 (from the author's introduction). Part I of the book begins with the suppression of Native revolts in German Southwest Africa in 1904-1907. Part II speaks to Military Culture and the lessons of 1871 and Part III covers WW I.The author uses an extensive amount of primary resources to present a very compelling case, yet, also draws unsubstantiated conclusions from incomplete records and entries. Despite the attempt to remain objective, there is a readily detectable tone of bias.As a military analyst and instructor I felt the book was useful as a tool for comparing the lessons of the German experience with the US Military experience over the last 10 years. For instance: is the US Military only capable of thinking in Military terms? In light of Joint and Combined Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, has the US Military morphed into a "polycratic" institution? Does the Diplomat stand with the soldier? Is there a set of mutually reinforcing values and characteristics that inhibit decision making?Regardless if these lessons are German, Indian or American, the questions for any Military are the same, are essential and must be asked.All in all, a good book that is a little heavy to read with some very compelling evidence, yet, also some bias and speculation in presentation.Dr. Terry TuckerCombined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

Very factual, and puts history in a neat package. Too neat of a package. Her very methodical argument has not holes or room for any other ideas, but instead of being convinced I felt like facts were forced into a box.

Absolute perfection. A essay to remember. The authoress uses a fabtastik background and a clean style to achieve the books aim.