Dawn Of Eurasia

Eurasia is big, diverse, and very different from Portugal.Bruno Macaes is to be congratulated for the courage and erudition he brings to bear on this monster of a subject but he gets lost in the weeds when analyzing China and Chinese politics.If China were not Eurasia's anchor tenant, this would not matter so much, but China is deciding the continent's future, so it matters a great deal. Two examples:"..the boundary between the political elite and the owners of capital has tended to disappear, rendering the former more or less incapable of standing against the latter. Divisions become matters of bargaining or technical adjustment and no longer tend to be seen as irreconcilable." There is absolutely zero evidence of this. 98% of China's bottom income quartile own their homes free and clear; all the land is owned in common, as are the commanding heights of the economy–the entire FIRE segment, utilities, communications, energy and transportation: 33% of the economy. Government rules the private sector with what would seem to us an iron hand and is about to make it transparent to the upcoming Social Credit program.Speaking of the Chinese Dream, Macaes asks, " what exactly is the dream; what does it consist of? Or, in other words, what does China and its leadership want to have such that they would consider the period of national humiliation over? That Xi does not say." This is simply untrue. The Dream's two stages were articulated by Confucius 2500 years ago, adopted as the nation's agenda by Mao in 1949, and the first stage goal was set by Deng Xiaoping in 1978: "By 2021, poverty must be eliminated and everyone must have a home, a job, plenty of food, education, safe streets, health- and old age care."And, sure enough, all those goals will be met on schedule and under budget.Phase Two of the Dream will then become the agenda and the first leg, to last from 2021-2035, will be bringing China's GINI below Finland's, the current champion. By 2049, the aim is to surpass Finland (a convenient example of a modern, socialist state). Then the country will begin serious work on reaching Confucius second stage:"Now to have states, families, and selves is to allow each individual to maintain a sphere of selfishness. This infracts utterly the Universal Principle, gongli, and impedes progress. ...Therefore, not only states should be abolished, so that there would be no more struggle between the strong and the weak; families should also be done away with, so that there would no longer be inequality of love and affection [among men]; and, finally, selfishness itself should be banished, so that goods and services would not be used for private ends. ... The only [true way] is sharing the world in common by all (tienxia weigong) ... To share in common is to treat each and every one alike. There should be no distinction between high and low, no discrepancy between rich and poor, no segregation of human races, no inequality between sexes. ... All should be educated and supported with the common property; none should depend on private possession." ... This is the way of the Great Community. [Kang Youwei, Liyun Zhu called Datong Shu].

Mr. Macaes book blends travelogue with geopolitical analysis in a manner that seems to have irked some readers. I concede that I once counted myself among those irked. The book's first quarter I read with skepticism and it was after a lengthy hiatus that I endeavored to read on. As I did so the nature of the author's conception became apparent, and I quickly found myself entranced with this wonderful tale of the currents of today and the world of tomorrow.Allow me to first explain this initial skepticism before setting forth my grounds for its emphatic dismissal. The ostensible topic of Mr. Macaes' book is the growing interconnectedness between the historic poles of the Eurasian landmass, an interconnectedness that is social and cultural but principally economic. A reader could reasonably expect such a thesis to be buttressed by facts and figures, trendlines and projections. That expectation is dashed when we instead find in The Dawn of Eurasia the musings of dressmakers from the Caucuses and professors from countries glossed over in geography class exhorting the importance of national myths.Dashed expectations often leave the expecting with a feeling of insult, a sense that the expectation was correct and an approach at odds with it therefore incorrect. This was, in any event, the case with respect to my first encounters with The Dawn of Eurasia. What followed were attempts to reassert the correctness of my expectation: sure, I thought, these anecdotes are interesting, many anecdotes are. But arguments reliant on them are reliant on their selection among an infinity of choices, and tendentious selection can create an infinity of narratives.I read on nonetheless and began to see the sparsity of data and the richness of anecdote from a new perspective, a perspective still not aligned with my expectation but one that seemed to permit glimpses of deeper truths. For the bald fact of the growing integration of Eurasia is indeed not the subject of this book. Such a book would in fact offer little but truisms to readers who see the pace and nature of the globalization everywhere they look, in light of which the integration of Eurasian powers is an obvious and inexorably corollary. What is far more interesting is the outlook of the parties that find themselves in varying degrees agent of and subject to this integration.Put differently, the integration itself is certain while its nature, by virtue of its dependence on the all too human features the participants bring with them, remains uncertain. The critical question then becomes: what are these features? The contemporary Westerner, Macaes asserts, believes that these features are those that have come to govern their own societies. Adherents of today's Western neoliberalism see their worldview as not only incorporating what the chaos and violence of their 20th century experience taught them but also rightly reflecting what it should have taught the entire global order. The core of this teaching seems to be that whatever neoliberalism's failings, it promises the best hope to avoid the destruction visited upon their societies by the zero-sum, emotionally resonant, will to power colored worldviews of the last century.Europe's faded prominence relative to other Eurasian powers, however, means that though evangelize and teach they may the adoption of such teachings is no longer in their control. This point, Macae argues, seems not fully appreciated by Eurozone bureaucrats who, historically accustomed to holding the strings of global power, are not in the practice of rigorously checking their assumptions against the beliefs of non-European parties whose beliefs have only recently begun to matter.That this multipolar world was inaugurated only recently is in the end immaterial, however. What is important today are two fundamental, related questions. First, is the Eurozone assumption that today's non-Western great powers share the values, even if not the implementation, of neoliberalism accurate? Second, what are the implications for Europe and the West at large if these powers do not share these values, but instead hold other values and worldviews that may not only resemble those of Europe's bad old days but also offer their adherents unique strengths and advantages?Answering the first question brings us back to the primacy of anecdotes and testimonies in the Dawn of Eurasia. Mr. Macaes implies that this question can be answered no other way, and in the final analysis I found myself convinced of this at well. You cannot find a worldview in charts and graphs. To expect to do so or worse determine that if you cannot it means it must not matter would be a grave failing, a failing likely attendant to reliance on overly technocratic methodologies sadly too often seen in Brussels. Worldviews, existing alone in the minds of people, are rather revealed in the text and subtext of revealed human words and human actions.The most striking case from the book in this regard is doubtlessly found in the sections devoted to China. Chinese obfuscation and the inherent imprecision of assessing worldviews makes this a challenging task and one that requires some trust be granted Mr. Macaes. Accepting that, the clear outlines of a Chinese worldview deeply at odds with the neoliberal global order becomes apparent. I will not compete with Mr. Macaes excellent portrayal of the contours of this worldview beyond a few broad strokes.Dubious Chinese assertions of their desire to only foster win-win situations on a global scale notwithstanding, the Chinese world picture seems to be as follows. The Chinese mind envisions a world where lesser Eurasian powers are offered advantageous economic arrangements with China, without the Western human rights or reform strings attached that are often perceived as interference. In doing so, China often offers local industry the opportunity to develop with Chinese loans and eventually participate in global supply chains and promises to bring a bigger picture, more holistic approach than American corporations hostage to shareholders.So far, so good; it is not difficult to understand why so many Eurasian powers have been open to Chinese investment already. But those that have accepted this investment have learned that while it may have came without the formal strings of the West, it is in no way unencumbered. In all such relations China maintains a preeminence carefully guarded and absolute. Mr. Macaes hearkens back to similar arrangements in dynastic China where lesser powers paid China annual tributes. These tributes were part of an arrangement in which China offered tangible benefits to the lesser power, but a capitalistic exchange between parties they were certainly not. The serf pays, the vassal provides; a system of obligation the terms of which are established by the more powerful party.Now, such an arrangement is not unique to Chinese history and I don't believe Mr. Macaes believes the historical parallel to be precise. Nonetheless, the "too good to be true" deals offered by China are often just that, and the privilege enjoyed by China is not limited to economics but also intrudes into other dimensions of national sovereignty such as holding political positions at odds with Chinese sacred cows like the status of Hong Kong and Taiwan and the treatment of the Uigurs.The Dawn of Eurasia contains many similar examples from China as well as other worldview variant powers such as Russia and Turkey. To address the second question posed above, however, it is sufficient to remain on the subject of Eurasia's new superpower, China. What does it mean for Europe and the West to share global space with a competitor that thinks not in terms of the next quarter's economic results but rather regards itself as a civilizational power asserting civilizational interests? Whose citizens regard themselves not as economic actors in a global rules based system but members of a historically great people, possessing what a quoted Chinese student called a unique "sense of psychological identity" they will sacrifice to not only protect but globally project?The answer seems ineluctable. And with it the equally clear path forward, despite the wish of neoliberalism to never see such a world return. Mr. Macaes speaks with Chinese who state that with respect to conflict their ideal is to win before the opponent even knows they are fighting. The time has come to recognize a fight has begun and to accept that it won't be governed by contemporary European values and ideals. While a true return to the belligerency of the European great power days must be carefully avoided, so must care be taken to not attempt to compete on a global stage against a coherent civilization without being one oneself.

Very good book and illuminating on the unfolding geopolitical order in Eurasia and necessary for our times to read it.

Interesting mix of travelogue and geopolitical commentary. Seems both timely and prescient. However sometimes seems to go off on tangents which do not necessarily support the thrust of his argument (but the tangents are pretty interesting in of themselves).

Thought provoking, an excellent read!

Great insights on how EU functions and how that impacts how rest of world sees it. In partcular he shows that rules based approach of EU can be a great strength and weakness.

Lack of knowledge on Eurasia

The book revolves around a six-month journey through Eurasia that the author has undertaken. It takes you to places you did not even suspect existed, such as a floating ghost city in the middle of the Caspian Sea. It takes you to the hearts and minds of people in places that Westerners may regard as backwards, but are at the center of the action, such as East-Turkey. It takes you to an Indian Muslim in China who, when asked what the main difference is between India and China, shoves a nugget your way: “[In China] you get rich by helping everyone along the [economic value] chain to make money. You need the chain to be there tomorrow. In India no one can afford to think about tomorrow and so no one thinks about the other people along the chain.” The book contains various such curiosities.But these more interesting pieces fill perhaps 10% of the book, which I found otherwise disappointing. The big downsides of the book fall apart in two categories: echo and one-sidedness.Let’s start with ‘echo’. By this, I mean that the book repeats what others have said before, but has little to add on those points, while also making it insufficiently clear that these points are not new. For example, the author discusses how it used to be believed that there is only one kind of modernity, to wit the European, later the Western kind of modernity. Then he proposes that there are (going to be) different, competing kinds of modernities. While interesting and probably true, these ideas can already be found, indeed in greater detail and better argued, in Martin Jacques’ When China Rules the World, written some 10 years earlier (and a much better book than the name suggests). Maçães clearly has read this book because he cites it for different reasons. Although I do not think that the author had bad intent, it would have been useful had the author shown that ideas have a history. Instead, he seems to claim the idea as his. (“This book adopts a third view...”, page 35.) Similarly, when the author describes how it suddenly hit him that the EU is about making rules in a way comparable to artificial intelligence, I would like to know who really had that idea and whether it is written down somewhere. As this is a viewpoint of very high analytical value, I would like to inform myself from the original source. This book does not allow for that. Thus, we have neither new insights nor a good overview of analyses.Another way in which the book reads like an echo is that the author clearly set out to find that Europe (the West) no longer matters. Again, a fine point, but not new, and it is hardly interesting to follow the mental travels of someone who merely set out to confirm what he has already decided to believe. It would have been more interesting had the author explored the relativity or extent of that finding. If you talk, for instance, to people in Ukraine or Russia, Europe has lost its authority, but not its appeal. People may still want to copy things European (but not all), on a voluntary basis, from a position of strength. It would have been much more interesting had the author taken on the task of comparing alternative views with an open mind. While the level of understanding of international politics, relations and economics reached by the author is rather high for a (former) foreign affairs minister, it has very little to add for those who have already informed themselves beyond the daily newspaper.Then the one-sidedness. As an example, the book gives a lengthy description of the view on Vladimir Putin’s Russia as a country where chaos (including in neighboring countries) is necessary to generate a source of power: chaos scares people, so they are more inclined to give their support to a strong man. Such a view on Russia could certainly be included in a book of this sort (although, even though the author has spent half a year travelling Eurasia, interviews on Vladimir Putin’s Russia with regular Russian citizens in, say, Yekaterinburg are conspicuously absent), but this interpretation completely neglects the fact that chaos, oligarchs and mafia were handed down to Putin from the Yeltsin years. Has Putin instigated chaos, capitalized on it, or is this simply the situation he has to work with? This question is extremely difficult to answer, and for a balanced treatment that aids the reader in understanding (the emergence of) Eurasia it is hardly productive to reproduce American propaganda alone, without mentioning alternative interpretations of the facts.Another, frankly eye-popping point where the author does no more than copying American propaganda is when he states and discusses as an obvious fact that the United States are no longer willing to be the only one playing by the rules, and therefore change their game. He is welcome to believe so, but for the purpose of his book, which is to further the understanding of Eurasia, it would have been more productive had the author also discussed that there is not a single person in all of Eurasia (other than apparently the author himself) who believes that the US ever played by the rules to begin with. Indeed, the US not playing by the rules is a major source of frustration across Eurasia, and is often seen as one of the main reasons why Eurasia is drawing closer together. The US have started an illegal war based on fabricated evidence in Iraq, leading to exasperation even among their European NATO allies, to give just one example. North Korea’s and Iran’s security concerns are seen by many as legitimate, given the fact that the US have made preemptive strikes and regime change important elements of their foreign and defense policy. Perhaps the author had one particular area in mind where the US do (more or less) play by the rules, but this is not clear from the text. Whether one likes Vladimir Putin or not, he speaks for most of Eurasia, indeed most of the world when he says that: “Every four years, there are elections in the US, after which the new president decides which treaty to tear up, which international laws to flout, and which agreements to breach. How can we work towards peace and stability this way?” (St. Petersburg Economic Forum)In a way, the flaws mentioned above could be summed up as follows: the book aims to make the reader understand Eurasia...informed by the viewpoint of the US, without offering the reader background, references or alternative views. This is perhaps understandable from the viewpoint of a former Portuguese foreign minister, who no doubt spent half his time taking input from across the Atlantic Ocean, and who wishes to land a profitable job in the UK, America’s cheerleader and closest ally, but it hardly adds to an understanding of Eurasia.Conclusion: this book contains interesting anecdotes from various places across Eurasia that give the reader something of an image of what is going on in those parts of the world that most people will not usually have on their minds, as well as a collection of theories and viewpoints that are, admittedly, of interest. However, since these theories and viewpoints are so highly selected, and do not usually include the viewpoints of those actually living in Eurasia, the cumulative takeaway for the reader is limited. Two stars: one for the topic, one for the stories.