Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq Paperback – December 16, 2008

This book offers further proof that those who don't understand history are destined to repeat it It is a comprehensive and clear discussion of the history of insurgency from the American Revoloution through the current mess in Iraq. I think of it as an education in one book. I found the history of the troubles in Ireland especially enlightening. Anyone who can continue to defend our incursions into Vietnam and Iraq after reading this book is delusional.

Thoroughly enjoyable and extremely informative on many events that I had never understood. Succinct and well written

Former Kennedy appointee William R. Polk traces the history of guerrila warfare from the American Revolution through the Spanish guerrilla war against Napoleon, the Philippine inserection against the US, the Irish experience, Tito in Yugoslavia, Greek civil war, the Mau Mau, Algeria, and Vietnam involving French and Americans.Polk offers incisive observations, although faltering in denying the accuracy of the Domino Theory that motivated our involvement in Vietnam. The execution of the Domino Theory may not have been neatly accomplished following the fall of Saigon, but why should it be? The point is, it did happen with Laos toppling, Thailand unsuccessfully (!) invaded twice, and Cambodia falling to the Khmer Rouge whose legendary incompetency was outdone by the government which led to the Killing Fields, certainly the strongest possible evidence of the accuracy of the Domino Theory concept.Polk seeks to draw conclusions about what each of the guerrila wars have in common and the means that seemed acceptable in some guerrila actions as applied unsuccessfully in other wars (as in the attempt to sue the strategic hamlet relocation plan that had worked in Malaya to Viet Nam where it was doomed to fail because of the deep idenitification of people with their village.Polk identifies three stages of guerrila warfare.First, establish the right to speak for the nation often by simply becoming the opposition. In the process, establish unity by eliminating challenges. In the American Revolution, the struggle between rebel and loyalist actually took precedence over the struggle against the British at times.Second, destroy the administration which is where the wave of VC-inspired assassinations of government officials and teachers came in. The VC screwed up during the Tet offensive when they took over Hue by immediately begining wholesale assassination of innocent functionaries giving them a black eye. Only action by the North Vietnamese Army got them to stop.Although everyone swallowed whole the double-talk about "reeducation" after the victory of the war, no doubt there were more deaths. Thensubstitute your own administration in areas you control (as the Committees of Safety did during the American Revolution, as did guerrilas in Viet Nam, Greece, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere.Third, begin military action. By this time, presumably, you already control a lot more than the central government will be willing to admit as happened in Viet Nam.In a 1963 study, Polk assigned a figure to each element to established scale of importance.Polk felt that the political element was 80% of the insurgency, existing the old order while substituting a replacement was 15%, and the military element was only 5%. It was not well received at the time, but based on our experience with guerrila actions since then, seems not unreasonable. It is exceptionally tough to successfully beat a guerrila war. On the other hand, we have learned that we ignore them at our peril.Interesting book.

Taught me a lot about intellectualism.

This was a very good historical perspective of Insurgency.

Good comprehensive look at the rise and growth of insurgent movements. Good critique of how both antagonists reactions further or hinder their own efforts. While very military it is a description of a political movement that uses violent action to carry out its agenda. Worth reading and well documented for those that want to have access to primary source

great book

Violent Politics takes a depressing but realistic view that "hearts and minds" are the most important aspect of winning against an insurgency. Military efforts are usually too little (or too much) and too late, merely further alienating a population already traumatized by internal problems and insurgency. Such an analysis, if correct, does not bode well for US and Allied efforts in Afghanistan.

They say that insanity is repeating the same mistakes over and over while expecting a different result, William Polk sets out the case against counterinsurgency with this in mind.

William R. Polk ist ein anerkannter Experte für den Nahen Osten und widmet sich in diesem Buch Aufständen und Guerillakriegen. Er stellt dabei zunächst die These auf, dass sich gewisse Strukturen und Phänomene stetig wiederholen. Danach geht er historisch einzelne Konflikte durch (Amerikanischer Unabhängigkeitskampf, Spanien, Irland, Indochina/Vietnam, etc.) und weist hier diese Element nach.Gut: Polk verliert sich nicht in militärhistorischen Anekdoten oder Schlachtengeschichte. Er stellt stets den Gesamtzusammenhang dar und bleibt auf einer sehr abstrakten Ebene. Leser, die sich für einzelne Episoden besonders interessieren, müssen sich weiterführende Literatur zuwenden.Polk sieht die Chancen einen Aufstand zu bekämpfen als allgemein schlecht. Er weißt deutlich auf die Kosten (nicht nur die finanziellen) der laufenden Operationen im Irak und in Afghanistan hin.Leider nur 4 Sterne, da Polk am Ende seines Buches die Frage, wie man den nun mit Aufständen umgehen muss, nach meinem Ermessen unbeantwortet lässt. Dazu empfehle ich die RAND Studie The Soviet Union and Muslim Guerilla Wars, 1920-1981: Lessons for Afghanistan", die Alexandre Bennigsen 1981 verfasst hat.