Joe Rochefort's War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway

This book is a must for any serious library of the Pacific War. It is high time that someone took a close look at the career of a man so important to victory and so overlooked as Joe Rochefort.To me the book also reflects credit on our Navy's leaders during the tight budget years of the 1930's. In spite of the tight defense budgets they were astute enough to nurture the fledgling cryptology service.Mr. Carlson repeats the myths that Ensign Gay witnessed the attack of the dive bombers demolishing Japan's carriers, and that the attack of the Torpedo 8 bombers made possible the success of the dive bombers, even though it has been demonstrated by The Shattered Sword and other books, that it took place far too early for Torpedo 8s attack to have any real effect on the SBD attack made long after the torpedo attack was over.A third matter requires examination. On Page 374 Mr. Carlson states as a definite fact:"In what writers called "The Flight to Nowhere" researchers found that the commander of the Hornet air group, Commander Stanhope Ring, incomprehensibly led his planes on a wild goose chase far to the north of the Kido Butai's actual position."This view does not stand investigation. Walter Lord, who wrote the first narrative history of the Battle back in 1967, had an opportunity to contact over 400 of the actual participants. On page 151 of his book, Incredible Victory, he states, "Commander Stan Ring had led his planes exactly as directed- 239o, 155 miles- but nothing had gone quite right... when they reached the intercept point around 9:30, there were no ships in sight." "By the time they reached Kure- the tiny atoll 60 miles west of Midway- it was clear there were no Japs in this direction."Peter C. Smith, the English author of "Midway, Dauntless Victory" has done extensive research seeking the existence of written documentary proof that such a flight ever took place, other than a brief long-distance phone conversation which has never been backed up by the logbook which is said to contain that proof, and reports of a radar bearing, which has likewise never been backed up by documentary proof. Here are just some extracts of his lengthy report to date into whether or not Commander Ring did or did not take the same southwest course as the Enterprise Group. Reports of two pilots who participated in the event are included below."Flight to Nowhere or Flight of Fantasy"Commander Stanhope Ring, the leader of the Hornet's first strike force on the morning of 4th June 1942, has been much criticized for adopting a course for that force which failed to find the Japanese Carrier Task Force.Bombing Squadron Eight's Action Report stated that they launched, "... nineteen airplanes in company with Scouting Eight and ten airplanes of Fighting Eight to attack a Japanese force of carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers reported in Lat. 30-35 (N), Long.178-35 (W)." Note the word used was "attack", not search, and the force to be attacked was specified. Their report did not say, or in any way use, the words search for a possible extra pair of carriers, position unknown! The report of VB-8 continued by stating: "No contact was made in the vicinity of the reported position and the group turned south towards Midway to locate the enemy." That seems clear enough- they were looking for the Nagumo Force in the position that had been reported, not some nebulous, possible further enemy carriers.Admiral Mitscher's actual report read:"None of Scouting 8 or Bombing 8 made contact with the enemy on the above flight. After searching the prescribed bearing the Squadrons turned south to search in the direction of enemy advance. As it turned out, had they turned north, contact would probably have been made. This was due to the fact that when planes took off, they took course to intercept the enemy, at that time reported headed on course 140° T., speed 25 knots. About one hour after the planes had departed the enemy reversed his course and started his retirement. We did not break radio silence to report this to the planes."Clay Fisher, who flew as Ring's wing-man that morning, always felt that they took an outward track of about 239 degrees, just as Walter Lord always maintained. Clay told me:"All the time our flight was approaching our estimated enemy position I was constantly scanning above and to our right for enemy combat air patrols. If we had been flying on the course of about 265 I would have been scanning to the left. Our fuel amount was becoming critical to the point of no return.""After the BOM I always thought VT-8 had changed course to the right, away from our outbound leg. When all the later information commenced to be written about our northerly course I read it in disbelief. That's one thing I do remember about of June 4th and as I was practically operating on adrenaline those memories are still very vivid in my mind." Clayton added, "I computed the distance I could see if I was flying at 16,000 feet. There was no way I could have seen the smoke from Midway if we had flown the 265-270 degree course as alleged."Professor Thaddeus V Tuleja personally interviewed James S. Gray, leader of VF-6, and later obtained his eyewitness account in writing. In his 1960 book Climax at Midway he quotes from this source direct, and Gray stated that the Hornet and the Enterprise torpedo-bomber groups flew roughly the same course from their carriers to the target, gradually drifting apart over the course of time (Hornet's TBD's drifting more to the north, the Enterprise TBD's to the south.) Forced to choose between the two, he counted the aircraft and elected to cover the Waldron unit, which, he says quite clearly, made a "beeline" for the target. He makes no reference at all about either his unit or Waldron's originally flying a course of about 270 degrees, as claimed by some, or that Waldron made any major course correction until virtually on top of the Nagumo force. This negates the 270 degree theory. So Gray and Fisher both maintain that both carriers' air strikes flew similar courses to each other, not widely differing ones. But their factual memories are dismissed as "irrelevant" because they do not fit the assumptions of some! How can history be treated like that?A document known as Secret Information Bulletin No. 1 from the Command File World War II, entitled Battle Experience from Pearl Harbor to Midway, December 1941 to June 1942 was prepared by the United States Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief and issued on February 15, 1943. This was a considered document at the highest level. This document was de-classified on 27 September 1958 and a copy was made available to me by the Head, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington DC.Included as an integral part of this document is a map entitled Battle of Midway, 3-6 June, 1942. That map clearly shows the track of Hornet's aircraft, and it is exactly the same course, and a little to the south of, the track taken by McClusky and the Enterprise strike force, 240 degrees, though continuing further out before turning south, exactly as Ring claimed to have done. The citation on that map is that this force, "did not find enemy," and the main reason given is that the Japanese striking force made a changes of course.Unfortunately for the "due west radar plot" theory, Rear-Admiral Fleming's son, Colonel Allan F. "Chips" Fleming, Jr., told me that most of his father's personal papers were pitched after he died. "I was stationed overseas at the time and was not able to prevent their destruction." There is also no mention of any such radar plot in Malcolm LeCompte's article in the USNI's Naval History article. So, that being the case, then where exactly did that radar plot, said to have recorded a "almost due west" outward heading for Ring, come from other than memory?Commander Ring himself wrote an account three years after the event, which did not come to light until many years later. Although he did not include in that account an exact course, he did give a very precise description of where he ended up at the end of his outward leg, which was that he ended up where he had considered the enemy would be had it continued on its reported course toward Midway in order to recover its own aircraft.So let us return to some clues to seek another possible scenario to this puzzle. To do that lets us examine the two alternative courses under dispute.If we draw a line on a course from the Hornet Group's departure point until it meets the spot "between the last reported position of the enemy and Midway Island", you will surely have the spot where Ring said he had taken his force. He said "between the last reported position and Midway", not astern of, or to the north of, the last reported position. Plot what course would have taken him there from the Hornet, on about 236 degrees and at a distance of 178 miles. This would have been Ring's "Estimated Point of Contact" or Waldron's "down there", an estimate which the latter personally rejected for he was convinced that the enemy would have turned north well before then, which as we now know, they did.So I ask the following questions with a completely open mind, and because sometimes people misinterpret statements to suit their own convictions. Would a course of 265 degrees, to 178 miles and then out again to 225 miles, as stated on the phone by Rodee, have taken Ring's force to a position between "the last reported position of the enemy and Midway Island?" No. Would a course of 260 degrees to "due west" as speculated by many other historians, have taken him to a position "between the last reported position of the enemy and Midway Island?" No. "Peter C. Smith's full essay and Source Notes may be viewed on his web site:[...]This one issue denying the existemce of the "Flight to Nowhere" should not defer the reader from buying this book. As a portrait of Joe Rochefort the book is excellent and the details of the working of the code breakers are fascinating. Accurate accounts of the Battle of Midway are available in other books including Peter Smth's "Midway, Dauntless Victory".

A little dry at points but an Inter eating little known or told about a remarkable man who persevered in spite of Navy meddling

After recently viewing the 2019 Midway film and previously the 1976 Midway film I noticed the character differential of Joseph Rochefort (JR). Therefore, I purchased this book to determine who JR was. Now I have read this outstanding, well researched, biography I understand the most recent film came closer to the real person. Information provided by Carlson is intelligence materials released in the mid 1990’s that US military radio ease droppers were sworn to secrecy by the entire community. This position was told to me personally by Navy veterans at stations CAST and HYPO at the turn of the century. These individuals were astonished at the questions I was able to ask them which they were reluctant to respond for they indicated they were to never to reveal this information.There are all sorts of interesting items in this book. For instance, in 1940 the code breakers were using IBM tabulating systems identical to machines being used to teach computer technology in the sixties. The biography is very well organized with maps, photographs, references, and index very effective and helpful. The four appendices provide clarity to the text with the first being the DSM citation presented posthumously in 1986 to JR for his contribution to The Battle of Midway in 1942.A great deal of the material regarding Rochefort’s military progression was interesting to me. I enjoyed reading this biography where Elliot Carlson reflects JR’s Officer Performance Reports (OPR). I retrieved my OPRs and compared wording and ones I had created for others which had similar phrases of praise as Rochefort’s. For the military careerist this book presents an interesting look into the US Navy Officer Promotion System and awards decorations during this time period. As an officer with 30+ years no wonder JR the mustang was contemptibly viewed by his fellow Naval Academy graduate colleagues’ badly. This man did not finish high school and did not have a college degree. How this happens in this closed society in the early and mid portion of the 20 century is remarkable.Carlson takes the reader through the Pacific War in personal detail which provides enhanced understanding for the historian and novice alike. He provides the distinction of Station Hypo and Station H and in the former the colorful life in “The Dungeon!” All these places familiar to many that have been stationed on Oahu. After reading and visiting Bletchley Park, home of ULTRA, where the German Enigma was broken I was very impressed how the US Navy was able to break Japanese codes so readily.This extensive work casts doubts on the conspiracy theory put forth in Stinnett’s 1999 book , “Day of Deceit.” As opposed to Stinnett Carlson uncovers COM 14 was not reading IJN JB-25 (a or b) transcripts for they only targeted direction finding of Japanese warship locations to understand their movements. Additionally, Carlson reveals prior to the Pearl Harbor raid (Japanese radio deception) and confirms many times in the text IJN 1st Air Fleet (Kido Butai) had radio silence from 25 November-7 December.This is one of my favorite books. It has materials missing from even US Government publications regarding Pacific war history. It is a fabulous read and is straight forward. I wish I had written it!

This is a good story, not just from the standpoint of the life of Joe Rochefort, but the history of the US Navy in the interwar years and during World War II. I am impressed at the author’s research, and his attention to detail. I feel like I really got to know Joe and could see that he like anyone is a complex character.

A wonderful work about one of the great -if not the greatest - cryptanalyst of WWII, and also a story of absolute unfairness , just because Rochefort wasn't from "Annapolis Club" - he has risen from the ranks , a "Mustang" as they call in the military - a career cut to obscurity and only in our time was given a just recognition of his contribution to the victory over Japan; a must read , certainly;

Gives a real timeline when events were taking place in the Pacific war, at times it seems a little repetitive but that just hammered home who was who and what was taking place. I found I retained more of what I learned from this book. Very interesting and open my eyes to what was happening behind the scenes. Mind you the Midway part seems to slow things down with all the repetition. Joe Rochefort was definitely an extraordinary individual. Never read the appendix in a book, but in this case it is really informative.

We can draw parallels between the work of Joe Rochefort and his team, and the data analysts these days. There are just so much in common if you think deep enough. Love the book.

Most readable warts and all tale of this private warrior and a realistic assessment of his contribution to US victory at Midway June 1942.The book did not shy away from Rochefort's character flaws either

Definitive biography of head of USN radio intelligence Station Hypo at Pearl Harbor 1941-42. Missed attack on Pearl (considerable traffic analysis available but amost no SIGINT, also Washington did not provide MAGIC decrypts to them) but did very well for Coral Sea and got Midway bang on. Lots of traffic analysis and just enough SIGINT from IJN code JN25b (although lots of controversy over how much of that code broken and when).Then-Commander Rochefort was a "mustang", not an Annapolis grad nor even a civilian college one. Brilliant but difficult fellow who made powerful bureaucratic enemies at the USN in Washington though Pacific commander Nimitz valued him highly. His enemies managed to lever him out of Pearl in late 1942 and he was largely sidelined for most of the rest of the war.Great and enlightening read, for intelligence aspects, for the early Pacific War and for inside the USN.Mark CollinsOttawa