Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942

This book is exhaustively researched, but wears its erudition lightly. Detailed, battle-by-battle accounts of the major sea encounters, with maps, and well-drawn portraits of FDR, Churchill, Admiral Yamamoto (fascinating tragic figure!) and many others. I can only praise this book, a must for anyone interested in the Pacific theater of war.

Je n'ai commencé à le que récemment mais je ne peux pas laisser tomber!

Me ha gustado mucho el libro, me ha entretenido mucho. Es fácil de leer y no se hace en ningún caso pesado. Para ponerle un pero, añadiría que al tratarse de la guerra entre el 1941 y 1942, falta el episodio de las batallas marítimas en Guadalcanal, el libro finaliza con la victoria americana en la batalla de Midway

An outstanding eloquent rhapsody of the initial causes for the Japanese estrangement from the U.S., which unexpectedly, culminated in Japan's aerial devastation of Pearl Harbor. Subsequently, "[i]n four months, Japan had conquered one of the greatest empires ever to be brought under one flag.... The Imperial Japanese Navy remained virtually unscathed, having lost nothing larger than a destroyer" (p. 269).Unfortunately, the author's subjective malignancy against General Douglas MacArthur, compromised the book's overall integrity, with references to hindsight strategy and monies paid, hence, reducing the rating to 4.75 STARS. For instance, "Pulling the army back to Bataan was the only move that made any sense, and MacArthur should have done it the first week of the war" (p. 238). Further, "However, it is a fact that MacArthur received, by order of [Philippine] President Quezon on January 3, 1942, a payment of $500,000 from the Philippine treasury.... There is evidence that [President] Roosevelt and [Secretary of War] Stimson knew of the transactions and did not object to them" (pp. 243-244). Brief biographies describe Adm. Yamamoto (p. 65+), Adm. Nimitz (p. 127+), Adm. King ( p. 161+), Vice Adm. Halsey (p. 201+), Comm. Rochford (p. 302+), Rear Adm. Spruance (p. 394+). Yet curiously, no information provided regarding MacArthur's background, which includes, No. 1 graduate from West Point, General father appointed Military Governor of the Philippines until 07/04/1901, served in frontline combat during WWI with 42nd U.S. Infantry (Rainbow) Division, former Army Chief Of Staff prior to Gen. Marshall, developed the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), etc. Moreover, MacArthur retired as a four-star General effective 12/31/1937, whereupon he moved to the Philippines to act as a military contractor consultant, for an undisclosed compensation. By decree from Chief of Staff Gen. Marshall, MacArthur was reinstated to the Army on 07/27/1941 as an official U.S. presence was needed, and designated Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East. (See, MacArthur's memoir entitled "Reminiscences: General Of The Army" and Arthur Herman's tome entitled "Douglas MacArthur: American Warrior.") So whatever criticisms assaulted MacArthur, formal ownership of military activities, reigned only 3 months prior to the 12/07/1941 Pearl Harbor destruction.Notwithstanding, the descriptions concerning the brash Halsey's raids, the courageous successful Doolittle Raid, the chaos of the Coral Sea Battle, and, the ubiquitous Battle of Midway, provide an intriguing kaleidoscope of the myriad factors affecting the WWII Pacific theater in 1941-1942.

I so thoroughly enjoyed Mr Toll’s second volume in this series that I decided to read his first installment and I am very glad I did!Many good reviews have been written so instead of a review I would like to indulge in a little critique but I would like to make clear that just because Mr Toll did not fashion his story to include a few things that I think important and just because he indulges in a theme that I think is a red herring does not detract from his wonderful narrative. The red herring theme is not really a very important part of the overall story.The author makes reference a few times to a supposed rivalry or competition between naval air and the battleship folks. It comes across as if the “black shoe” navy did not really trust that aircraft could make any meaningful impact in war. On page 57 (paperback) he says:“The fate of Force Z…settled old and bitter arguments. …it was a conceptual triumph within naval circles all over the world for the cause of aviation, and did more than even Pearl Harbor to undermine the power of the Mahanian ‘big gun club.’”There was no power to undermine. The navy, to include the “black shoe” admirals, had fought hard to keep control of its investment in its air wing. They wanted aircraft and the platforms to launch them. In the run up to the attack on Pearl Harbor it was the Japanese carrier fleet that was getting all the attention. President Roosevelt, the War and Navy Departments all were concerned about the tremendous threat posed by the Kido Butai. This was before Pearl Harbor and before the demise of Force Z. The fate of Force Z was a Churchill decision against the advice of his admirals. That those two attacks had a major influence on “the cause of aviation” is a story that has been retold over and over. The thing is, history, facts and naval spending going on in America in the run up to war show that to be wrong. A fiction. A myth.Back in 1940 Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee said, "The modern development of aircraft has demonstrated conclusively that the backbone of the Navy today is the aircraft carrier. The carrier, with destroyers, cruisers and submarines grouped around it[,] is the spearhead of all modern naval task forces."He had just got a massive naval spending bill through the House. It called for 18 Essex Class carriers and the planes to stock them. It is called the Two Ocean Navy Act. Mr Toll mentions that bill but he gets the amount of expenditure wrong. The proposal CNO Admiral Stark delivered to Vinson was for 4 billion but Vinson bumped it to 8 billion. The above quote from Vinson came from the news conference after passage. Reporters wanted him to explain why the government was spending so much money. The government and the navy would not invest so much treasure and resources unless the navy really wanted naval air power and the carriers to launch it. Among other classes of ships, the bill also called for 2 Iowa Class battleships and 5 Montana Class battleships. The US Navy wanted a powerful modern force that would not ignore the battleship but it did want a preponderance of carriers that would be the backbone and spearhead of the modern task force. The navy was committed to air power to be the decisive striking force of the fleet well before that terrible week in December 1941.Since the aircraft carriers, and the six major carrier duels between the US and Japan, had such a tremendous influence on the fighting and the outcome of the Pacific War it would have been nice if the author could have told the reader what the two carrier forces looked like at the start. And, since his narrative refers to the doctrine and influence of Mahan, it would have been nice to get a picture of the battleship fleets of both countries as well. For the sake of taking stock of the US Navy’s actual combat doctrine he should have also investigated the influence of war gaming at the Naval War College and fleet exercises conducted in the 1930’s. The author discussed the importance of Theodor Roosevelt to modernizing the navy in his day but did not mention Carl Vinson once, the man responsible for the navy that won the war in the Pacific.In the epilogue to this fine book the author does a superlative job of summarizing the Battle of Midway and the fate of Joe Rochefort. He does a fine job of illustrating how Rochefort is remembered by historians but does not paint a complete picture of how he is remembered today by his country. He was posthumously awarded the Navy Distinguished Service Medal in 1985, he was posthumously awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1986 by Ronald Reagan and he was inducted into the National Security Agency/Central Security Service Hall of Fame in 2000.Then the author continues with the carriers vs battleships theme:“Now [after Midway], somewhat belatedly, the Japanese navy acknowledged the primacy of carriers over battleships and other surface units. Hulls that had originally been laid down as battleships were converted on the stocks to new carriers.”I know of only one battleship that was converted to a carrier after Midway, the Shinano, a Yamato Class battleship. No other battleships or battlecruisers were laid down. There was a plan for a super Yamato Class but those plans did not get very far. Meanwhile the Japanese planned for six Taiho Class carriers, 1 was built, and 15 Unryu Class carriers, three were built. The Unryu Class were laid after Midway. It seems the evidence points to the Japanese really wanting carriers but that does not fit in with the author’s desire to depict a preference for battleships.That said, I think Mr Toll has still produced a richly detailed story that does a great job of examining the issues that influenced Japan’s decision to make war with the US and the events of the first six months of the war. This is, I think, a very necessary contribution to Second World War literature. There are many books covering the war against the Nazis but not so many that cover the war against Japan.A very curious thing about the paperback edition I received: the text is missing the notes citation numbers. I have a nice list of notes in the back of the book but I have to really struggle to figure out which part of the text they refer to. I am considering buying the hardcover.