The Mystery of Consciousness

Drawing on material originally published in The New York Review of Books, Searle confronts what he terms the mystery of consciousness. The mystery lies in the causal relations which lie at the base of the phenomenon. We do not as yet have a real theory as to the operations of the brain, much less a theory as to the operation of consciousness. As Searle puts it, in a memorable metaphor, we may be trying to understand a car engine by studying the activities of the molecules within the metal that constitutes the engine block. Some (Crick, e.g.) think we need to look beyond neurons to something larger (neuronal circuits, e.g.) and some (Penrose, e.g.) to something smaller (micro-tubules, e.g.).Despite its importance, consciousness is often evaded as a subject of both science and philosophy because there is the overarching fear that if we commit to the irreducible subjectivity of consciousness we are, simultaneously, committing to dualism and, thus, flying in the face of the scientific method. There are such dualists of course, the principal exemplar being Sir John Eccles, and there are any number of materialists. Searle argues against both, saying that consciousness is a biological phenomenon like digestion or photosynthesis, but one that we don't yet understand (though we are undeniably aware of its existence).In arguing his case he considers the works of six other scientist/philosophers: Crick, Edelman, Penrose, Dennett, Chalmers and Rosenfield. Penrose, Dennett and Chalmers come in for the greatest criticism and the book includes interchanges between Searle, Dennett and Chalmers.While the material is complex the exposition is lucid. I particularly enjoy it when Searle reverts to the street vernacular rather than the exclusive language of philosophy and science. This is not what one of my philosophy teachers called `subway reading', but it is clear and accessible to lay readers. Some reviewers have commented that Searle's explanations of the thoughts of others are considerably more accessible than their renditions of their own ideas. Those other thinkers are likely to protest that their views have been misrepresented but at least in the case of Dennett and Chalmers they have an opportunity to defend themselves.I found particularly interesting Searle's distinctions between first-person phenomena (pain, e.g.) and third-person phenomena (gravity, e.g.). The subjective cannot be made objective and the objective cannot be made subjective. Similarly, while the world consists of particles in fields of force, the particles are organized into both natural systems (galaxies, mountains) and social creations (nations, currencies, football teams). This does not entail dualism. Consciousness, he writes, "is caused by the behavior of microelements of nervous systems, and is realized in the structures of those nervous systems. Consciousness is not reducible in the way that other biological properties typically are, because it has a first-person ontology." It exists when it is experienced as such.Searle also includes a look forward in which he anticipates the next steps which we need to take in order to deepen our understanding of consciousness. This may well be the work of generations, not years.A fascinating, forthright book.

John Searle doesn't really make many claims himself in this book. It's more of an overview of the (poor) state of our scientific understanding of the phenomenon of consciousness, which I think he does a fantastic job of. The only claim he makes is that "brains are sufficient for consciousness", which to anyone not named Daniel Dennett is plainly obvious. He gives an overview of other philosophers' views on consciousness and an opinion on each. It's a very good state-of-things book. Nonetheless, because of the examples he used, it really allowed me to reconceptualize how our brains work (to see the brain as an experience machine and not a computer) and lead to a better understanding of myself, which is one of the reasons I am going it five stars.

Another excellent polemic by Searle. His contention that "consciousnes" is observable along a two-fold structure is substantively true: (1) from the scientific materialist point of view of the independently verifiable third-person perspective, and (2) from the immaterialist point of view of the unverifiable first-person perspective of things like "pain." But unlike most other contemporary theories of consciousness, Searle's it's not either/or, but and/both, and almost no one else is taking note of this. Those philosophers that are, are coming up with preposterous theories along the way. Searle wants to reposition them back into the life science of neurobiology, not their arcane logic, bogus epistemology, or reductivist materialism.Let's begin with the obvious. Both perspectives are "verifiable" from the first-person point of view: We all know and agree that the first-person experience of pain, the notions of governments, the rules of inference, and other subjective "qualia" occurs ("qualia" is just a marker for individual conscious experiences). While we can and do measure some mental phenomena by (1) their third-party reports, such as someone carrying an umbrella likely thinks it's going to rain, we have trouble when we come (2) to first-person sort of qualia, e.g., what it is like to feel "pain," what one means by the phrase "good government," who is the "best painter," what I mean by "red" house, I feel depressed, etc.According to the scientific materialist, "only" those third-party reports qualify scientifically. You know the scientific paradigm: Only that which is verifiable and not falsified is true. That's fine, except what does one do when the "activity" that people report is going on in that amorphous, first-person, thing called "consciousness?" Do we deny that people have it, such "pain," that we don't have a conception of the "best government," that we don't know what they mean when they say "I feel depressed," etc.? Well, according to Searle, one has to accept this consequence if the current theories of consciousness are on track. According to the current paradigms, all first-person reportage is spurious or nonsense or (in the case of Dennett) non-existent.Searle's defense of "naive naturalism" is a defense of all our basic intuitions. Per Searle, most of what has been written recently is contrary to these intuitions, and Searle exposes them all. It's not a pretty picture in how Searle portrays others, and they evidently have not taken to kindly to it. But it is a defense of what we think to be basically true. Upended are a myriad of characters, some lightly, some not so lightly. Besides Dennett, there's Chalmers, Penrose, and Churchland. Searle may be tactically off to the wrong start, but he's definitely on the right track. There is definitely something wrong with postulations that "consciousness" does not even exist (Dennett), or that if it does exist (Chalmers), it does so in some extreme form that doesn't even mirror want we know to be true. It's either too scientistic or too dualistic, but whatever the method, it's on the wrong foot.Searle's intuitions are certainly right, even if his modus operandi has begotten him ill-will (esp. Penrose). For those wholly unfamiliar with "consciousness" as Searle minimally conceives it, consult his "Rediscovery of the Mind." Even without that prefatory work, his arguments in this book still have cogent force and conviction. Searle's conception of what it is minimally to have "consciousness" may be off track "here and there," but his basic intuitions are obviously and instinctively on track.For the sake of science, the understanding of the mind, and of what constitutes and explains "consciousness," I hope all Searle's detractors take this neurobiological polemic to heart. Searle is right to argue that methodology doesn't outweigh reality, and whatever the methodology for the study of consciousness, let's hope philosophers get in line behind neurobiologists, who, along with psychologists, know that "intrinsically first-person ontology" exists when it comes to consciousness -- even if scientifically, it doesn't fit the paradigm. It might not fit the classical materialist paradigm, but things like "life" and "consciousness" just don't. Densely, but articulately and cogently, argued. Highly recommended.

This book approaches the problem of consciousness not from the standpoint of neurobiology or psychology, but philosophy. The gain is that the often complicated 'hard science' is neatly simplified and summarised. The pain is, all too predictably perhaps, agonising over semantics and definitions.In his analysis of a book on consciousness by Crick, a scientist 'generally hostile' to philosophy, Searle warns that 'the problem of having contempt for philosophy is that you make philosophical mistakes'. Crick evidently misunderstands the precise concept of qualia, fails to distinguish between two different types of reduction and is inconsistent in his reductionism as a consequence.So Crick's real problem then seems to be not one of understanding consciousness but of understanding terminology - or rather, of using it in the same way as Searle does. Crick, according to Searle, 'preaches eliminative reductionism while practising causal emergentism'. Scientists' main concern is with fundamental science, not epistemology or ontology. Ultimately, consciousness exists, regardless of the labels we use to explain the phenomenon. Searle virtually admits as much when he says, 'strip away the philosophical confusions and you still have an excellent book.'Elsewhere, Searle isn't so generous. Daniel Dennett's argument is 'counter-intuitive (to put it mildly)'; it is a 'conjuring trick' and the author uses 'evasiveness' and lacks candour. He even talks of Dennett's 'intellectual pathology'! If words could kill.Unusually for a philosopher, Searle is an entertainer as well as a communicator and thinker. In the final analysis, though, if or when the breakthrough comes in understanding consciousness, it is much more likely to come from neuroscience or psychology than from the often torturous discipline of Plato, Descartes and Searle. While The Mystery of Consciousness is often a riveting read (especially the exchanges between Searle and Dennett), it is one that will probably have limited impact on groundbreaking work in this area.

An excellent contribution to this subject. This book is well written by a thinker who uses consistent and precise language throughout, He also provides lucid descriptions of the alternative schools of thought - such as the main advocates of strong and weak AI. I particularly liked the way he was prepared to respect his adversaries - like Daniel Dennett - by including detailed transcripts of correspondences in the book.

It was a disappointment to me. I like the books of John Searle, this book is not among my favourites.

it was a good read

Very good condition and a good read.