The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (Yale Agrarian Studies Series)

The State of the State of Nature: Modernity and the Closing of the WorldThe modern state has come closer than ever to achieving the "end of history". Increasingly, "non-state" spaces are being brought into the fold of "civilization." Eschewing the normal protagonist, the nation-state, James C. Scott presents his subject: Zomia - a massive chunk of mountainous territory forming a transnational "non-state" region in upland Southeast Asia. Zomia represents a final frontier, or hold-out zone where progress, development, "civilization" and the state have yet to gain full control. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia offers a new account of state building that seeks to overturn conventional understandings of both civilization and un-civilization. Scott's revisionist narrative aims to correct, "the huge literature on state-making, contemporary and historic, [which] pays virtually no attention to its obverse: the history of deliberate and reactive statelessness."Scott's history of Zomia provides a narrative of "those who got away" from the taxes, conscription, disease and hierarchy of the state. Scott argues, "the signal, distinguishing trait of Zomia, vis-a-vis the lowland regions it borders, is that is relatively stateless." A closer look at the "nomadic", "tribal", swiddening peoples of Zomia indicates that state building took place alongside an opposing "anarchist history" in which people looking to escape the state and its demands fled to the hills establishing more mobile, egalitarian, and consequently variable societal, political and cultural structures."State-Space" vs "Nonstate Space": a Geographic Model of State PowerFor most of human history the state "occupied a minuscule portion of the world's landscape."3 From this perspective the state remained limited by a geographical dependence on "fixed-field grain agriculture [which] has been promoted by the state and has been, historically, the foundation of its power." Fixed agriculture allowed for settled populations, which enabled the state to "ensure that economic activity was legible, taxable, assessable, and confiscatable."The state "typically arose where there was a substantial expanse of arable land." Concentrated grain production allowed for, settled, permanent populations on which to build a tax base and military apparatus. Areas suitable for "wet rice cultivation", Scott deems "state-spaces" which he contrasts to "non-state space" or "locations where, owing largely to geographic obstacles, the state has particular difficulty in establishing and maintaining its authority." For Scott, "the ungoverned periphery...was...a constant temptation, [as] a constant alternative to life within the state."Run to the Hills: Slavery, Taxes, and the Fiscal Demands of Centralized RuleMaintaining state space required two things: [1] manpower [2] grain. Scott argues, "The concentration of manpower was the key to political power in premodern Southeast Asia." Military superiority required access to "concentrated manpower" which could support "densely packed cultivators of permanent grain fields who produce a considerable annual surplus." The surplus feeds the state as "they and their rice fields are, above all, fixed in space. legible, taxable, conscriptable, and close at hand."The concentration of manpower needed to feed the state was not voluntarily exchanged. Scott wants to make very clear that the state did not function in terms of a Lockean social contract. Rather, populating the rice fields required slavery. So much so that no "states flourished except by slave-raiding on a substantial scale." States were sustained by "taxes" which often depended on the value generated from slave based agriculture. According to Scott, the state was often "inclined to press...to the limit", and when "pushed to the breaking point, the subject" was likely to run to the hills.Hill Peoples: "Backwardness" as a Political ChoiceConventional narratives treat "hill peoples" as backward, barbarous, primitive vestiges of a pre-civilized era. Scott argues this narrative is wrong and instead insists that "hill peoples" are, and have always been "barbarians by design." Hill peoples sought to position themselves outside the scope of state power or to prefer tribality to peasantry.To avoid the state "hill peoples" practice both [1] state evasion and [2] state prevention, which involve the adoption of a distinct set of economic, political, social and cultural practices. State evading characteristics are traits "that make it difficult for a state to capture or incorporate a group... or... appropriate its material production."15 State preventing traits are "those that make it unlikely that a group will develop internally durable, hierarchical, state-like structures."The characteristics of "hill peoples" are: [1] location at the margins [2] physical mobility [3] swiddening agriculture [4] flexible social structure [5] religious heterodoxy [6] egalitarianism and [7] nonliterate cultures. These characteristics should be understood "on a long view as adaptations designed to evade both state capture and state formation." Being "uncivilized" in this respect represents a "political choice" to evade "the hard power of the fiscal state, its capacity to extract direct taxes and labor from a subject population."The Triumph of the Modern State: the End of History or a Symbiosis Lost?In an "anarchist history" the state and the non-state have for the larger part of history been a constant fixture in human organization. States made non-states, and non-states made states. Trade in both people and goods, sometimes voluntary,sometimes coerced created a deep interdependency between "civilization" and the "barbarians." Classical padi states were forged from an cosmopolitan mixture of slaves, and immigrants. Non-state spaces were populated by a diverse array of fugitives from state power. Both state and non-state were essential to the process of human "progress."Scott's subject, "Zomia represents one of the world's longest-standing and largest refuge of populations who live in the shadow of states but who have not yet been fully incorporated." But, even Zomia has been slowly brought under State control as technological advancement eradicates distance, and gives states even greater power to penetrate into the once inaccessible backwoods. At the periphery, non-state spaces, such as Zomia served as a "shatter zone", or release valve for the social tensions endemic to the hierarchy of state-style social organization. Scott concludes that "in the contemporary world, the future of our freedom lies in the daunting task of taming Leviathan, not evading it." "An anarchist history" requires that we think deeply about the broader consequences of "high modernism" and the ubiquitous triumph of the modern state; where escape to the "periphery is not much more than a folkloric remnant." If "valley states" and "hill peoples" have always existed as "reciprocal and contemporaneous" what does the loss of "non-state" space entail for the future of the human condition? When the weight of the state becomes unbearable, what do we do when there is no where left to run?

If "taming the leviathan," that's currently taking slavery to a "whole new" and "inescapable" level and "representative-democracy" that deliberately foils the "wisdom of the crowd," while our "representatives" are purposely bred royals, ultimately "selected" by ROME, is doctor Scott's idea of a "solution," then doctor Scott is running a "mop-up" operation to "deter" potential new escape strategies, and lead those of us who would prefer to escape back into bondage to the state core. Nice job doctor Scott. I knew he'd go there.Doctor Scott is also a Freemason. Freemasons are totally beholden to the state and to ROME. I would easily compare him to Karl Marx, who brilliantly described the evils of "Vatican-centric" capitalism, but gave the world a "fake" solution "communism," which enslaved "everyone" in the Soviet Union.*This is professor Scott's solution. Seems a bit Hegelian to me...The world I have sought to describe and understand here is fast disappearing. For virtually all my readers it will seem a very far cry indeed from the world they inhabit. In the contemporary world, the future of our freedom lies in the daunting task of "taming Leviathan, not evading it." Living in a fully occupied world, one with increasingly standardized institutional modules, the two most hegemonic of which are the North Atlantic modules of individual freehold property and the nation-state, we struggle against the enormous disparities in wealth and power spawned by the former and the ever more intrusive regulation of our interdependent lives by the latter. Populations have never, as John Dunn tellingly puts it, depended “more abjectly for their security and prosperity on the skills and good intentions of those who rule them.”1 And, he adds, the only frail instrument we have for taming Leviathan is another North Atlantic module—via Greece: "representative democracy."*If you got this far, I'm going to recommend that you follow doctor Scott. His description of the "problem" is unmatched in the rhe literary and academic worlds; and to use his own vernacular, "he did sort everything into the correct bins." That's really really important, if you're trying to understand the "people-farm" and devise alternative strategies.I absolutely recommend that you read all of doctor Scott's books. I have; and it's the best $100 I've every spent...

There can surely have been few other books in Asian Studies and certainly not in South East Asian Studies in recent years that have been as widely anticipated as James C. Scott’s The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Southeast Asia (Yale University Press, 2009). The Art of Not Being Governed does not come out of a clear blue sky but represents an extension and adaptation of many ideas with which Scott has worked over the years. Many people first gained some familiarity with the theory underlying this new work through the seminars and keynote lectures Scott gave at intervals over an extended period at elite centres of learning worldwide, often under the rubric ‘Why Civilizations Can’t Climb Hills’. Although Scott is a political scientist and anthropologist, readers of Reviews in History may well be familiar with one or all of his now classic works The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Subsistence and Rebellion in Southeast Asia (1976), Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (1985), Domination and the Arts of Resistance: The Hidden Transcript of Subordinate Groups (1990) and Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1998). Blending the anthropological with the meta-vision of the political scientist has been a distinctive element of Scott’s style and of the interpretative frameworks he likes to build, with the micro-details of particular spaces and times being used to feed into grand schemes of explanation. In this respect, his latest work does not disappoint, although he states that with The Art of Not Being Governed he finds himself now also becoming something of an historian.Where previously Scott’s concern was to show the commonalities between peasant societies worldwide, The Art of Not Being Governed extends this interconnection to swidden agriculture. In this new book, settled, lowland peasant societies and mobile swidden agriculturalists are to be considered part of the same cyclical econoscape of interaction, with ‘the state’ as the defining impetus for the development of both ‘systems’. In discussing the details of settled and swidden agriculture Scott can also lay claim to authority derived from his work as Director of the Agrarian Studies Program at Yale, and a life-long interest in the development of new understandings of marginal and ‘illegible’ spaces of economic and political life, particularly in non-urban environments. One of the skills demonstrated in this present book is the bringing together in a focused way of a disparate range of technical information about crops, about transportation and so on, and then relating these to an environmental context in a way that is simply unavailable, and largely unimaginable, anywhere else. These early chapters are lively, provocative and informative. Setting aside the issue of whether or not one agrees with the conclusions, Scott raises the bar in this book for thinking about the highland-lowland binary, which has been so entrenched in the literature on Southeast Asian history. His work ultimately reinforces the binary, rather than challenges it, but what it does achieve is the ‘paradigm shifting’ effect that is acknowledged on the book jacket: now the book has been published, it will be impossible to discuss the uplands of Southeast Asia in the same way again, and some who had never discussed them before will be discussing them for the first time. Many of us who have been working in this field for many years can feel some sense of satisfaction that our rather eclectic range of interests and obscure points of reference are gaining institutional authentication. So, in some ways and for some of us, this shift in focus could be a very good thing, and for academia in general it is good that such books can still be written and that they can provoke a wide debate, especially where that debate centres upon understandings of the relatively unloved subjects of classical, early modern and pre-colonial non-European societies, allowing these subjects to take centre-stage in discussions on global history.Yet Scott has also long been a controversial figure who is undoubtedly guilty of the sin of over-generalization. Clearly he is not shying away from controversy with this book, and it too is over-generalized. So, beyond the clear contribution that this work makes to revivifying a moribund debate, or developing a new one, there are some limitations as to how we might conceive of this work as ‘A History’. One might wish to see it as a history in the experimentalist vein, in which all historical writing is recognised as being fundamentally fictive, but there is nothing in Scott’s work to suggest he might be engaging with any particular theoretical strand of historical writing. The grandeur of the longue durée or the differentiated temporal spheres of Braudel should not be compared with Scott’s vision; nor should the work of Ladurie, who sought also to explain mountain-scape histories. These historians fundamentally worked in innovative ways with conventional historical sources and these sources did a huge amount of the intellectual work in locating these environments within a grand schema. Scott’s work is built up almost entirely from secondary sources, almost entirely in English. The influences he cites are not historical at all but figures from anthropology and political science such as Pierre Clastres, who developed a theory of stateless societies and resistance to states that, like Scott, involves an underplaying of economics in favour of millenarian prophets, and an anarcho-primitivist perspective on the removal of the political constraints of ‘civilisation’.Most telling, however, is the debt of gratitude he declares for the work of Edmund Leach, most especially his Political Systems of Highland Burma (1), of which Scott states in his preface that ‘There are few books that are “so good to think with.”‘ It seems clear throughout The Art of Not Being Governed that this, too, is what Scott is aspiring to. However, Leach was an anthropologist who was ‘frequently bored by the facts’ and unashamed in his statement that Chapter VIII of Political Systems, titled ‘The Evidence from Kachin History’, was at best ‘in some ways a complete waste of time’ and could be omitted by the reader. Scott’s liberal referencing of Political Systems of Highland Burma places Leach’s often contentious interpretations of data to the fore as a critical point of support for his own arguments, especially Leach’s interpretation of the term gumlao as an example par excellence of strategies of state resistance. Yet, even Leach himself acknowledged that he had essentialized terms such as this and that they had a historical modality with evolutions of meaning in different contexts over time. Gumlao was not part of a binary of oppositional choices; even where there might for a time be no ‘chief’ as a result of violent overthrow, a functioning kinship system was always maintained through which socio-economic relations and socio-ritual hierarchies were configured, and such characteristics limit the internal traction and relevance of terms such as ‘egalitarianism’ and ‘anarchism’ as applied from outside models. The term gumlao that Leach identified in his reading of 19th-century sources was a product of the extremely volatile situation in regions to the north of the kingdom of Burma, produced by the extension of British power to the west and south and the Taiping and Panthay rebellions to the east; it reflected attempts by all groups caught up in this chaotic time to position themselves favourably in relation to multiple ‘states’ in a complex understanding of regional geo-politics, as much as it was to resist them. Leach’s relational dynamic between ‘the Kachin’ and ‘the Shan’, which Scott also references extensively, was likewise focused towards a narrow interaction of particular, essentialized communities and not towards the complex multi-valent relationships of ‘Kachin’ (and ‘Shan’) communities across a range of dialect and culture groups, with multiple nodes of social, cultural, economic and political orientation spreading lattice-like across what is today northeast India, Tibet, Burma, Yunnan and northern Thailand. This kind of binary obviously becomes critical if one concentrates attention on places where the Kachin-Shan dynamic exists, just as the state-anti-state binary becomes critical if concentrating on the points at which the state cannot assert its rights to hegemony; it is less powerful as an explanatory tool when looking at the modes of interaction between Kachin sub-groups not determined by their relation with ‘Shan’, or when trying to understand the internal dynamics of supposedly ‘non-state’ societies with each other. With Leach, there was undoubtedly a shaping of evidence to fit a theory, and in creating a book with which to think, evidence and theory may be uncomfortable bedfellows.Certain concepts that have long been associated with Scott, such as ‘arts of resistance’ and ‘non-state space’, continue to do a lot of the operational work in this new book. These terms, and the ideas underpinning them, have often been the subject of criticism and non-state space is in particular a phrase that is used widely but rarely receives proper critical definition. Early on in the text, while one may be drawn into the argument by admiration of Scott’s intellectual fluidity and verve, terms like ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ seem to be bounced around across this historical and geographical (global) landscape in a rather disconcerting fashion for an historian. Scott utilises the term non-state space a priori in this current work: non-state spaces exist and therefore we have to explain (now historically) how they came into being. The orientation is, however, from the state outwards rather than taking the spaces that historically have straddled, interconnected, ignored, influenced, utilised and resisted the various states with which they are in contact on their own terms, and as a starting point. Neither state nor non-state are historically unchanging concepts, nor might they be considered environmentally produced oppositional norms, particularly in relation to flows of economic interaction locally, regionally and globally. The nature of ‘the State’ in classical, early modern and colonial contexts varied massively, as do the historical meanings and relevance of the term in China, in Yunnan, in Tibet, in the Princely States in Northeast India and in the state of India, in what was to become Laos and Thailand, in Vietnam, in Islamic polities; but none of this political, economic, societal or cultural variety is brought to the fore by Scott. The State remains a largely undefined term in this book. Although clearly the early polities and classical states of Southeast Asia are very different to colonial states, we are told that the only historical period we should discount from the model he proposes is the period after the Second World War because of the intensification of the process of state enclosure. But why, then, discount this from the frame of reference? The dangers in this approach can already be seen as I have recently read an abstract from one academic working on border issues relating to Burma where they state that they are relieved that through Scott’s work that the imperative to give time depth to understanding the rationale of state action against minority ethnic nationalities has been removed; the state can be seen always to act in the same way.Thank you !!!

This extremely informative book opened my eyes to the true nature of so-called "barbarians" and civilization. The cover design is god-awful but the content is excellent. For those who like to consider ideas that challenge mainstream history and theories around it. The book focuses on Asian geographical areas, but the concepts apply to the history of civilization building the world over.

What a great book. Long and at times repetitive but very interesting for those interested in minority groups and hill tribes in particular.

Very good book

Kindle版紙の本の長さ： 464 ページ　出版社: Yale University Press (2009/9/29)　ASIN: B01N75OC23　のレビュー　地道な村落調査や発掘調査をしている人たちが本書を読んで、どう思うだろうか？　こんなあたりまえのことを今さら声高に言われてもなあ。みんな知っていて、調査研究の前提にしていることではないか。そんな声がきこえてきそうだ。　著者も最初にことわっているように、本書の紹介する個々の事実には、なにも新しいことはない。焼き畑農耕が灌漑水田よりも労働生産性が高い（＝同じ収穫を得るのに、少ない労働ですむ）とか、東南アジア山地に住む人々は、先住民ではなく、むしろ最近移動して来た人々である、などなどわたしも知っている。　そういうあたりまえのことをクドクドくりかえす口調に少々うんざりするものの、やはり、痛快な本だ。歴史は歴史書を残した側にあるのではない。文書を残すような国家から逃亡した人々こそ多数派なのだ。　世界遺産のアレとかアレなんて、ゴミの山にすぎない。儒教のたわごとなんて、暴力団がみかじめ料を奪う屁理屈と同じ。仏教の深淵そうな教義なんて奴隷をこき使う口実だ。などと、ふつうの研究者が現在の政府や現地の人々にきをつかって言わないことをどんどん書きまくる。70歳すぎた老人が言いたいことを言い切った爽快な著作である。第六章と第7章の間に収められた、リテラシーを選択的に捨て去ったという仮説も、ひじょうに刺激的。あまりにもユートピアすぎると批判されそうな仮説を、遠慮なく示してくれた。　楽しい読書であったが、本書が描く山の民の生活は、20世紀なかばにはほぼ国民国家の領域に吸収されてしまった。現在の山の民たちは、国歌の枠のなかで暮らしていく以外にない。学校で国語を勉強しなきゃいけないし、選挙にも行かなきゃならない。また、山の民と対照的に描かれる盆地の農民たちも、収奪されるだけの弱い人々であるわけではない。さまざまな戦略で、現代社会に適応してしぶとく生きる人々である。本書では山地民と平地民の日常的なつきあいの描写が少なすぎる。あるいは、山地民は間では女性の自立度が高いと言いながら、本書で描かれるのは、足の速い頑丈な男のイメージしか見えないのだが。３歳ぐらいの幼児を連れた妊娠中の18歳の女性は、本書が描かれる状況にいかに対処したのだろうか。　その結果、歴史観の基礎としてすばらしいが、単純に現在の状況にあてはめるのは、危険だと思う。東南アジアではなく、むしろ日本や東アジアの歴史を見るときのヒントになるのではなかろうか。　専門の方々は、難しかろうと簡単だろうと読まねばならない文献は読むだけだろうが、一般の方のために難易度。　福岡アジア賞を受賞した東南アジア地域の研究者、Thant Myint-U (Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia), Anthony Reid (Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce)　などと比較すると、具体的な描写や統計資料は少ないので、むしろ簡単。最初に見慣れない表現や単語が出てくるけれど、何度もくりかえされるので、すぐに慣れる。読みにくいと感じるとすれば、東南アジアの地理が頭に入っていないためでしょう。エーヤーワディー川とチンドウィン川とシッタウン川がどの順番でどっちの方向に流れているかなど、地図で確認しながら読んでいけばいいのですが。kindle版では第6章　Table 3 Escape Characteristics of Cropsが画像になっていて読めない。それ以外は別に問題なし。もう少し詳しい地図があるべき。