An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978-2012

As Afghanistan “fell” to the Taliban in August of 2021, to the disbelief of the public in the "West", scholars and journalists engaged in a contentious debate on where our two decades long counterinsurgency and state building efforts went awry. While much of the debate in the “West” focused on our failed attempts to reform and build the Afghan military in the image of the U.S., endemic corruption in the government, and the lack of motivation among Afghan security forces, Dr. Mike Martin (author of this book) emerged as an astute analyst of local dynamics on Twitter and in the media, often correctly predicting the trajectory of local alliances that facilitated the transition from “government” to “Taliban” control in the summer of 2021.His expertise stems in large part from his research for this book, which he conducted over years as a British Army officer in Helmand and consultant for the British Government, greatly helped by his knowledge of the Pashto language and lengthy interviews with local actors. The central argument of this book is that the conflict in Helmand was shaped in large part by local dynamics consisting of tribal and familial feuds, as well as long standing disputes over water, land, and control of the opium trade in the province. While many commentators in the West have portrayed the conflict in binary and ideological terms – the fundamentalist Taliban vs the democratic government – Dr. Martin’s persuasively argues that local rivalries and tribal loyalties superseded simple categorical distinctions and local actors consistently manipulated outside actors to resolve personal conflicts. In this view, the “Taliban” in Helmand simply consisted of whichever fluid alliance of local actors and tribes happened to oppose the government at that time, while the government and police consisted of their rivals.With the introduction of British and American forces after 2001, ignorant of the local context, political actors simply manipulated the British and Americans, as they had done to the Soviets before, into eliminating rivals by claiming they were “Taliban”. The Helmandis, as they had always done, simply played both sides to resolve personal disputes, in an ever shifting and extremely complex web of local alliances and family networks in which actors often maintained relationships with all sides to ensure safety and security if one faction prevailed. Our failure to understand that the conflict in Helmand (and by extension Afghanistan) was really a complex local civil war rather than an ideological battle between two cohesive factions (the Taliban and the government), allowed "westerners" to be manipulated by local actors and often lead to U.S. and British support for government actors that engaged in corruption, drug smuggling, and double dealing. These dynamics, which were obvious to the local population, caused many Helmandis to believe that westerners were incredibly stupid and must be working against the goals (development, security, democracy) that they loudly proclaimed.As the author points out, if the British and U.S. had recognized the local nature of the conflict their entire rationale for bringing democracy and freeing Afghanistan from the Taliban – and by extension our presence in the country – would have been removed entirely. What Helmand really needed was a knowledgeable mediator that could resolve local disputes, not development aid and western counterinsurgency doctrine. While much more could be said about the brilliance of this book and the discussions of development aid, corruption, the role of Pakistan and India, and the local trajectory of the conflict, I will close by saying that this book is essential reading for anyone who wishes to understand our role in Afghanistan and the recent events that contributed to its fall. Regarding the events of 2021, Afghans simply shifted their alliances to the “Taliban”, much in the same way that they did when the Soviets left in 1989 and when the Americans came in 2001, as it became apparent that the Taliban were likely to win. Although not stated directly, Dr. Martin implies that we may have been better off leaving Afghanistan entirely, and not sinking time and resources in attempting to settle an incredible complex local conflict. As Bill Roggio of the Long War Journal has stated about this book, the sheer complexity of the conflict and the myriad number of actors involved makes any attempt at counterinsurgency in Afghanistan a near futile effort. While revisionist works will likely pop up in the future (as they did after Vietnam) with arguments that we could have succeeded by doing “X” or “Y”, this book is a poignant reminder that such efforts would have been near impossible and that we should always be skeptical of simple narratives and the utility of military power in solving complex conflicts abroad. Although we certainly could have performed better, this books has made me deeply skeptical that any state building project in Afghanistan could have been realized.In his observations on Helmand, Dr. Martin is also clearly following a venerated recent tradition of civil war scholarship that places local dynamics, rivalries, and politics, rather than ideology, at the center of violence in civil war. For those who wish to read further, I highly recommend Stathis Kalyvas’s The Logic of Violence in Civil War, as the dynamics that Dr. Martin describes are clearly at play in present and past civil wars, although perhaps to a lesser extent than in Helmand. I highly recommend Dr. Martin’s book for anyone interested in understanding Afghanistan and the dynamics of conflict more generally. This is among the best books on these subjects I have ever read and completely eviscerates the prevailing narratives from government and media sources about the sources of the conflict in Afghanistan.

There have been a number of rather whiny books about how Britain got it wrong in Afghanistan: usually written by those with an axe to grind. This book is critical of policy but without the febrile rage and the conspiracy stories. The author speaks Pashto and has had tours in Helmand as an officer and as a civilian adviser. All wars are a series of dialogues within the bodies politic of the combatants (and a war with allies has this in triplicate). But Martin turns the concept on its head by a "customer-centric" approach: "what do the Helmandis think?". He achieves this by talking to a large number of Helmandis. The result will surprise many and shock some: the conclusion is that the British are allied to the Taliban with the aim of destroying Helmand.To get us into the mindset of the locals Martin voyages through the history of the area including the invasion by the British that included the defeat at Maiwand. With all the fervour of a small rugby nation remembering the time they achieved a surprise victory over a more famous nation the Helmandis treasure Maiwand and the defeat of the perfidious Angrez. The fact that no-one in HMG remembered this when Britain selected Helmand for its ISAF role reveals one key feature of Martin's book: Britain literally did not know what it was doing. This ignorance was amplified by the narrative we chose for the campaign (itself the by-blow of the Bushian them and us narrative). In this case there was a government (good) and (bad) insurgents. The latter oppressed the people and the Government shall set them free.At certain points this was true but it missed the key point that the people were both in the government and in the "insurgency": they were not neutrals upon whom the two parties acted, but were agents. Many clans would have members with both sides (The Master of Ballantrae approach). If Clan A runs an area (the 'government') then it probably controls the 'police' who are an active part of the local influence economy rather than just crime stoppers; so Clan B will represent the local 'insurgents'. If ISAF helps Clan A it is not necessarily making life better for all, it may simply be assisting in oppressing Clan B. The same issue arises for the Taliban (that is the Quetta and Peshawar shuras): wherever they put 'troops' on the ground they will find local rivalries having a powerful impact. One side or the other may inflict control via its local proxies but in so doing they automatically infuriate the enemies of the local proxy. In short Helmand was a highly developed version of my native Scotland before (and indeed after) the Act of Union (the Government clans would find no difficulty in grasping the situation) or England during the Wars of the Roses where some seemingly odd alliance are explained by looking at the errant nobles' maternal uncles. All politics is local politics and there are no more heartfelt rivalries than local rivalries.Martin covers all this in detail but one does wonder why the Coalition powers that be (the Clever Men At Oxford as Mr Toad might have said) could not have spotted that where drug eradication is involved local interest would be in having your rivals' poppies eradicated leaving your own. And where there are development funds you send them to your area not to that of their rivals. The last point is clear to anyone in UK in regard to our politics, but abroad we seem to suffer from memory issues.A very well-written and important book: all the more so for its calm exposition.

A paradigm of the war in Helmand unlike any other and despite the author's comments on the limitations of his work, when read in conjunction with and in contrast to contemporary Western military histories, an absolute relevation. Made me rethink absolutely every data point I had considered in other literature. Highly recommended for anyone seeking to understand the complexities of COIN operations in Helmand.

"It doesn't matter who you work with in Helmand, they are all the same tribe anyways."I was told this by an American official in Kandahar in 2011. It was not the time or the place to argue the point that this was a gross mischaracterization of reality and likely to feed into a disastrous engagement with local political divides and factions whose multiple inter- and intra-community conflicts dominate the local political choices made. My perspective at the time was also more macro, not detailed enough to present a convincing argument about Helmand specifically other than in quite general terms.Mike Martin does not suffer from that short-coming. His multiple rotations as a British officer and subsequent return as a researcher has allowed him to build a comprehensive narrative around the power politics of Helmand from the pre-Mujahideen days until now. Martin's account relies largely on interviews with local power brokers but he has treated the data well, pointing out possible contradictions, instances of possible manipulation, and by seeking confirmation of claims made. The result is a whirling dance in and out of alliances and allegiances that at times is at risk of becoming confusing as the names and locations pile up. Martin however manages to keep the reader on track by back-referencing who is who and playing what role at what time.This book, and similar accounts of the local reality, should be required reading for development practitioners, military personnel, diplomats, politicians, journalists, and especially the policy wonks who continuously pump out 'analysis' based mainly on six day helicopter and powerpoint tours of [insert area of choice here]. It is however perhaps the most useful for those who think that they already 'get it' and who earnestly wants to understand enough to at least have a glimmer of hope to successfully reach intended outcomes. The lasting impression is that no matter how complex you thought local politics were, they can still find a way to surprise you.'An intimate war' interprets Helmandi history and the narratives of local power holders through a perspective on violence and civil war largely inspired by S. Kalyvas. It emphasizes the agency of the local groups over the ambitions of the ideological elites at the center or in other countries. I find that I personally agree with most of the dynamics-analysis though I would perhaps ascribe more understanding to the ability of external actors to use local conflicts to gather social mass through mobilization. With this said, Martin's analysis provides an excellent account of the Helmandi socio-political conditions into which foreign and domestic interventions have gone forth so many times before with very little change in the local dynamics apart from patronage structures and what ideological flavor lends its name to local conflicts at a particular time.In the end, Martin's work aligns perfectly with my own analysis of social mobilization in Afghanistan (and Somalia incidentally) and reinforces what I call the 'ORSDINTI principle'. This is a tongue in cheek memory rule for would-be interventionists to remember that in relation to local outcomes, Our Ranch Salad Dressing Is Not That Important. There are many policy makers and wonks who would do well to remember that. Hopefully, Martin's book can drive that point home. It certainly has the capacity to if the audience is paying attention.

Islamic Jihad & Extreme Terrorism - part of my reading on the subject.