From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States

The author shows how Pearl Harbor was, one might say, fifty years in the making. Why would a nation which could not possibly win a war with the US fire the first shot of that war? I found the way this book answers the question quite gripping - I read it in just a couple of days.It is an utterly fascinating book that reminds us that, over time, many historical details are of necessity, over time, relegated to the heap of "history trivia" even if, in their day, they were of tremendous importance. For example, here the argument in naval armament conferences regarding whether the Japanese could have 70% of the strength of the American navy or only 60%. Yes, I can see your eyes roll, but the reasons for these two numbers are quite significant, and learning about the debate really did a lot to enlighten me about how Japan and the US viewed the Pacific Ocean and the way it dramatically decreased in size, so to speak, as naval and aeronautical technology advanced even in less than a decade, especially as the speed and range of ships increased. I had no idea that Guam was of such significance to strategists on both sides!The book is also a very readable introduction to the personalities who contributed to the sequence of events that eventually gave us Pearl Harbor, starting with Mahan, who I had seen mentioned from time to time. I did not realize, though, that besides being a naval theorist he was also especially interested in Japan. Sorry to say, his ambivalent views on that country included the "yellow peril" outlook.Yamamoto also figures heavily in the book - much more so than I would have guessed. You will see his evolution from a hawk to a person who was simply being realistic when he said, as he did many times, that Japan could not win a war with the United States. The irony that it was up to him to figure out a way to win the unwinnable was not lost on him.Finally, the book's main event, the internal struggle within the Japanese navy over that nation's relationship with the United States will both enlighten you about the convoluted evolution of the decision to go to war and give you a case study in dysfunctional organizational relationships that might prove useful by comparing to other moments in history.One thing I feel I have to mention is that there is some noticeable repetition. You will occasionally get deja vu because, yes, you did read almost that same sentence a few chapters ago! This might simply be a necessity of the presentation: certain events are retold from different players' perspectives, so of course one has to go over the same ground a bit. But it is distracting. For example, this pair:"In May-June 1940, the German conquest of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France so dazzled naval officials that they clamored for a so-called southward advance."Then later:"German successes so dazzled Japanese officials as to generate clamors for the southern advance."Also, there are a fair number of errors, like typos, in the Kindle version. Not so many as to seriously take away from what I got out of this book, though. I really liked it.

This is a very well researched and comprehensive work. It is highly recommended for those who seek a detailed understanding of Japan's strategic dilemma that propelled them into WWII.

This is not a book on naval strategy or tactics, not a review of Imperial Japan's national policy or its governmental system or the militarism it engendered, and not an assessment of naval theory. Rather, it details the history of Japanese naval policy and its application to the American rivalry. It is an extremely valuable work.Among the authorities available to Western readers, Dr. Asada knows this subject perhaps better than anyone else. Nevertheless, his writing escapes the bonds of dusty scholarship, making the book accessible to folks approaching the subject for the first time. His style is unpretentious, even warm, and it seems more like a front-porch chat than a heaving of hefty source material, though that is exactly what it is. Asada completed his doctoral dissertation, Japan and the United States 1915-25, in 1963 and has had four decades to deepen his research.Many people considering this book will already have read Kaigun by Evans and Peattie. The two books are complementary. Kaigun presents a broader scope of chronology and subject matter, dealing with some of the topics I specifically excluded above. Given Asada's focus, the two books provide perspective for each other. Another work that pairs well with Asada is Making Waves by Schencking, which dissects the political side of naval development up to the Washington Treaty.The naval treaties are central to Asada's book. Simultaneously symptom and cause, they mark the downward spiral from the acknowledgment of Japan's place in an imperialistic world to an inert core of self-worshiping delusion.I would like to have seen a few more things from Dr. Asada. The Mahan connection is an artificial starting point in considering Japanese naval policy, though a natural for pinpointing its American context; a chicken-or-the-egg study would be fitting--did Mahan inspire Japanese navalism or simply codify a pre-existing movement? Likewise, there would be plenty of grist to mill in analyzing the fundamental flaws in Japan's Mahanian theory. You may note that these quibbles apply to matter outside the scope of the work, so I must confess to some unfairness here. Perhaps the book's biggest blemish is something entirely outside the author's control: the incorrect front-cover caption about the battleship "Yamamoto."

Prof. Asada has written a readable, well researched book about how Capt. Mahan was held in great esteem by the Imperial Japanese Navy, and the consequences of their planning based on his principles.