The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger (Foreign Military Studies)

I have greatly appreciated this fine work by Colonel Gerhard Gross, a Bundeswehr military history expert and a widely published scholar. This is an expertly researched work that closely examines the development of German operational thought from the Kaiserheer in the late 19th century (e.g., Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, Alfred von Schlieffen, and Erich Ludendorff), through the Reichswehr (e.g., Hans von Seeckt), through the Wehrmacht (e.g., Heinz Guderian and Erich von Manstein), and to the Bunderswehr (e.g., Adolf Heusinger who led the formation of the new German military in the NATO structure). Colonel Gross has made detailed use of available archival records, memoirs, and other published materials to make a fine addition to the existing body of literature on both the German "way of war" and the operational art more generally. He notes limitations on his research (i.e., the destruction of German records during World War II), the bias in some material (i.e., German officers writing for posterity after World War I and II, and the practice of personalizing the guilt for "lost victories" on people like Moltke the Younger and Hitler--thereby avoiding the need for actually reexamining past practice), and conflicting views among German military thinkers on key issues. Indeed, he shows that German military thinking was not dominated by a single view during any given period, but was marked by discordant--sometimes contentious and acrimonious--views about the nature of future war (threats) and needed theory and practice. Frankly, I think Colonel Gross makes a very credible interpretation of the "evidence."I appreciated many great points made by Colonel Gross. First, I liked the examination of factors involving time, space and forces that are critical to operational analysis. Here, the book got off to what seemed like a slow start: Chapter 1 focused on "Definitions," particularly tactics, operations and strategy. Chapter 2 addressed "Factors and Constants," namely time, space and forces. While this theoretical approach was needed, it did make for a slightly tedious start to the book. Second, I liked the examination of the problems raised by a technical military solution without consideration of the political issues. Indeed, I keep returning to Clausewitz' fundamental dictum about the primacy of politics in my own professional work. Thus, the political object informs jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and the emerging jus post bellum. In fact, in many ways, this political "influence" extends right down to the tactical level, thus providing an explanation for the law of war itself (eliminating troop behavior that is inconsistent with morally and legally acceptable reasons for fighting the war in the first place). We can see problematic examples of this recent German military history. In jus ad bellum terms, in the late 19th and early 20th century, war was seen as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy; hence, the German violation of Belgian neutrality was seen as a military, not a political, problem at the start of World War I. Yet, international law has been evolving to a prohibition against such instrumental uses of force, as later affirmed in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand treaty and still later in article 2(4) to the UN Charter. In jus in bello terms, Colonel Gross examines the competing operational/strategic views that confounded German political and military leaders on the Russian front during World War II. In other words, German military leaders traditionally sought a war of annihilation, with such a war focused on the rapid elimination of enemy's effective military power before a war of attrition could set in (that is, a longer war that a country with lesser resources could not win). Critically, German political leaders, with some level of complicity from senior military officers, focused on a broader concept of annihilation based on a racial/ideological construct. This led to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide against combatants and non-combatants alike, all of which greatly complicated the on-going war effort. In just post bellum terms, earlier violations of prevailing international norms are likely to lead to international condemnation and post-war criminal tribunals. Third, I liked the comments on German learning behavior; for example, he looks at the "lessons learned" after the 1918 defeat (i.e., the need for a mobile combined arms doctrine) and the 1940 victory (i.e., the belief that the key to victory had been found). Fourth, I was intrigued by his comment that the "new" elites of the German military follow the premier career track as political-military officers, rather than the operations experts of yesteryear. Fifth, I appreciated his comments on structural problems in German thinking during various periods, to include failure to incorporate a consideration of logistics and overall resourcing issues. Finally, I also noted that he used in the "center of gravity" term consistent with the German schwerpunkt usage, rather than the over-convoluted definition/usage that we sometimes see in the West.Colonel Gross makes a key point in his conclusion: "German operational doctrine was a military attempt to solve the strategic dilemma of achieving continental hegemony without having a sufficient economic, military and political power base. It was based on the inability of the German military and political elites during the era of the world wars to recognize and accept Germany's real and limited power." Overall, it's a great work with terrific endnotes and a fine bibliography.

I only do World War I, and really August 1914. Any reservations I have revolve around the lack of anything but Army Infantry Corps as operational units. The entire inclusion of the HKK at the operational level is not covered. They are intentionally left out of what the author thinks is operational. So he and I have a difference of opinion which of course affected my view negatively. The second is stylistic, this is a very thorough analysis but can be arduous if not boring. So it is a matter of taste – did not satisfy me but easily could satisfy others.

Fantastic book! The author clearly unfolded a substantial amount of misconceptions of the German military that the public generally recognized throughout the 20th century using massive amount of credible sources. Although the reading could be a little repetitious and broad at some point, it is still a masterpiece! Definitely one of the best history books I've read! If you are into the overall theoretical readings of military history, this is a perfect book for you.

Do not mistake this for a point of entry into the field of German military history from the Wars of Unification onward. That said, if you already understand the issues and outcomes, this is an amazing look at the whys and hows from a unique and informed perspective.

Not quite finished reading yet; so far excellent- would like to see more on the later Bundesheer, including the current General Staff, such as it may exist.

After the first chapter, it became redundant and not particularly interesting.

Highly recommended

Well written and exhaustively footnoted exploration of the German Way of War as practiced in World War I & II. The book is a must read for anyone seeking to truly understand the origins of “blitzkreig” and its inherent flaws at the strategic level. A little dense at times due as the author traces the evolution of German thinking the conclusion of the book does an excellent job summarizing the key points.

No problems with the mail.... arrived quite quickly... looks like an excellent book! I just have to find time to read it...

No book like this one. A MUST for anyone interested in the subject. Easy to read although it's a complex subject