The Origins of the First World War (New Approaches to European History Book 52)

A useful narrative and analysis of international relations in the years prior to WWI. Mulligan is particularly concerned with avoiding teleological interpretations of international relations leading inevitably to WWI. He tends to stress features of the European international system that enhanced stability and worked to reduce the the likelihood of general war. Mulligan opens with a nice historiographic survey, followed by a fairly detailed chapter on international events in the years leading up to WWI and features of the international system. This followed by thematic chapters on 3 features often said to drive or retard the outbreak of general war; the role of the military and military competition, the role of public opinion, and the effects of international economic interactions and rivalries. He finishes with a nice narrative of the diplomacy involved in the outbreak of war. In general, Mulligan finds these features to be less powerful than argued previously and he sees the outbreak of general war as a highly contingent event. He clearly feels that if this crisis had been managed successfully, the European international system would have stabilized.Nonetheless, Mulligan identifies some changes in the international system in the decade prior to WWI that reduced the stability of the system. He points to alterations of the alliance system. Initially a stabilizing force based on flexible defensive alliances, alliances increasingly came to be regarded as essential security guarantees, making some nations the prisoners of actions by weaker partners, as shown by Germany and Austria-Hungary. Mulligan also points to the pre-war arms races and "militarization" of diplomacy, which encouraged deterrence strategy and brinksmanship.While Mulligan makes a number of good points, aspects of his analysis strike me as incorrect with respect to some specific points and his general orientation. He suggests that violation of Belgian neutrality was not a major factor in British decision making. For a convincing counter-argument, see Isabel Hull's A Scrap of Paper. He poo-poos military "timetable" accounts of inflexible decision making during the weeks prior to war but his analysis omits the considerable risks of losing whatever advantages might have accrued from a well executed mobilization. More important, his focus on international relations leads to neglect of at least one major structural and one major contingent feature that contributed to the outbreak of WWI.Mulligan comments that combatant nations felt that there vital interests were at risk in 1914 in ways that weren't perceived to be threatened in prior crises. He never, however, identifies the nature of the vital interests or who felt threatened by events. He points out that the critical decisions were made in Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersberg. The decision makers were conservative elites leading at least semi-authoritarian states. The perceived threats to vital interests were in good part domestic in nature. The Austro-Hungarian leadership, for example, was worried about domestic disintegration, not any real military threat from Serbia. These kinds of domestic issues were present in Germany and Russia as well and were a powerful destabilizing force. Mulligan points to the German Weltpolitik as driving Britain towards alliance with France and this (rather unrealistic) was pursued in good part for domestic reasons. While Mulligan might be correct about the relative stability of the international system, he never addresses these crucial domestic issues and how they interacted with international relations. The major contingent factor he doesn't address is the nature of monarchial leadership in the 3 imperial states. William II, Nicholas II, and Francis Joseph were not the brightest bulbs in the candelabra, and in crisis situations, this certainly mattered.