Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State

This is a fascinating book that looks into an important question that has, surprisingly, gained limited attention: Was the Anbar Awakening/ Surge a success? The Surge and the revival of the Counterinsurgency(COIN) doctrine in the 2000s have triggered numerous debates on its effects. However, the chain of events in the 2010s, most importantly the rise of ISIS in Iraq, demand us to reassess the Surge, particularly in Anbar Province the heart of the Sunni insurgency. As the tile of the book illuminates, the author offers readers a cautious assessment of the Anbar Awakening, seeking to explain why the success of the Surge was short-lived, as someone who was in Anbar right before the surge.The uniqueness of the author's writings, including his previous book, " War Comes to Garmsar" is his actual experience in these conflict zones as an academic and practitioner and his ability to immerse himself to the local customs. The center of gravity of Counterinsurgency operations is to "Win Hearts and Minds". Understanding local dynamics, therefore, would be a crucial part of successfully conducting counterinsurgency. In that regard, the author's arguments are solidly supported by what he saw and heard on the ground making his argument that U.S.intervention into Iraq had a detrimental impact on the country's security convincing. This book is, thus, a great read for anyone interested in understanding the rise of ISIS and the security challenges in the region.

Great write-up of the misunderstood success of the "surge" which masked the ongoing base of support for Islamic State ideology, values and personnel in Iraq. Underestimating this support led to the faltering of Iraqi security forces in the summer of 2014. Could have benefited from bringing in Arabic sources to strengthen the book's main point.

Many believe Iraq was 'unwinnable', a foregone conclusion.This book shows how it could have been saved - was almost saved - as late as 2007-2008. This, perhaps, makes the story even more tragic.

This one is as good as Malkasian's book War Comes to Garmser, about Afghanistan. And that is setting a very high bar.

Good read.

Whether the words of Tacitus or JFK, Malkasian reminds us - "Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan." For years Operation Iraqi Freedom veterans have watched as a steady-stream of books was published that generally attempted one of three things: 1) Take singular credit for the catastrophic success of the Anbar Awakening and Sunni Awakening; 2) Attempt to provide evidence to support the "it was good when I left argument" so as the author could claim to have had some special understanding of OIF that his followers did not; thus, ruined the chance for operational and strategic success; and, 3) Retold "war stories" from a micro tactical level that while entertaining and motivating, failed to help military professionals gain a better understanding of the campaigns so as to learn "lessons" that may be applied elsewhere. In his thin volume, Malkasian skillfully manages to persuade the reader through the presentation of evidence that not only was the Anbar Awakening not an operational or strategic tipping point, but that no single individual within the US Army or Marine Corps caused it; nor, was it singularly caused by the brutality of AQI and their "over-reach" with the Sunnis of Anbar. Instead, Malkasian provides evidence to demonstrate that self-interest was the primary motivation of the Awakening leaders - a self interest that included political and economic power motivations. While likely to upset some, Malkasian provides evidence to support a conclusion AQI was quite popular in Anbar with many possessing "hidden sympathies," and did not solely rely on brutality and coercion. He does note - "AQI left those who remained neutral alone. The logic was unassailable: oppose violence and be killed or stay quiet and be left alone." Why should this matter to us now? We should ask ourselves -"Is it possible that Sunnis in Iraq under ISIS control were treated better and achieved better outcomes than before under a Shia-dominated government or at the hands of Shia-Militia-Groups once their areas were retaken? Were they subjected to violence for remaining neutral? How will this sow the seeds of future conflict in Iraq? Why would it be in the interest of Sunnis to fight ISIS to the benefit of Iranian-backed militia groups and political parties?" Malkasian's book reminds us that we did not understand the Iraqis nearly as well as we convinced ourselves we did. He reminds us that self-interest is a powerful tool, and that only those in pursuit of Barbara Tuchman's March of Folly would be dumb enough to push policies contrary to self-interest. Malkasian's conclusions are clear and supported by an entire volume of evidence - the Anbar Awakening was not a tipping point, and the conquest of Anbar by the Islamic State should not have surprised anyone. As he notes - "The larger lesson is that internal cultural, historical, and social dynamics - sectarian divides, age-old tribalism, and the influence of groups claiming Islamic legitimacy - could not be redirected in the span of a few years." This book is a necessary addition to the library of any serious student of operational art or anyone attempting to understand how much we got wrong ten years ago that contributed to the outcomes in 2014 with the Islamic State.

This was a good read and accurate account of both the reality of Anbar and the failure of the awakening. The failure was largely die to internal policies of Maliki's government, but as Emma Sky has written, the real failure was I allowing Maliki to rule after me lost the election in 2010.The author did his book and himself a dis-service by contiming to refer to the Sunni movement ISI as AQI after 2010. ISI was not AQI and Abu Dua had zero affiliation with bin Laden. ISI recovered because it represented Sunni interests that were betrayed by both Maliki and US policy. We reap what we see.