A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 First Princeton Paperback Printing Edition

This analysis provides outstanding insight into the inherent deficiencies of the fiat money system (not based on a precious metal (gold) - only based on government fiat). The Federal Reserve utilizes the fiat money system to facilitate "controlled inflation" which has resulted in the depreciation of the US dollar by over 98% since Roosevelt's election. Gold was worth $20 an ounce in 1932. It is now worth approximately $1300. Do the math [(o.o5 - 0.001) / 0.05].Although the book covers the time period between 1857 and 1960, it applies to the situation today to an even greater degree than when it was written in 1963.

Frideman/Schwatz write a detailed history with few conclusions not fully justified by the evidence. Nevertheless, their book remains one of the most controversial ever written. Political and economic scientists from all over the world know they cannot refute the evidence presented by the authors, but they are always able to simply ignore the facts by claiming to be ''scientists''.

"He who refuses to learn history is condemned to repeat it". Milton Friedman gives an easy to read version of History for the period 1867-1960. If we are wise enough to read and apply his lessons, we will be better off because of it. Especially good reading during this election cycle.

Can't beat the master of what really works and what doesn't work, i.e. Keynesian theory. Free markets and capitalism work and are the only system that has helped improve the economic wealth of a country and its citizens -- INCLUDING AND ESPECIALLY THE LOWER INCOME CLASS!

"A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960" by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz is an epic in economic literature. The authors concisely analyze nearly 100 years of monetary history and prove why monetary economics matter. Their work, originally published in 1963, offers immaculate insight into endogenous and exogenous economic variables that shaped US history.When reviewing a classic text it is important to test it on two criteria: 1) it's ingenuity; and, 2) it's validity. In regards to ingenuity "Monetary History" paved the way towards a statistically grounded analysis of macroeconomics (in this case monetary theory). While "Monetary History" was groundbreaking it's truly memorable aspect is Ch7's "The Great Contraction". This chapter, which is now known as the money hypothesis, revolutionized the way economists thought about the GreatDeprhttp://www.amazon.com/review/R1C118WNLAM4I/ref=cm_cr_pr_cmt?ie=UTF8&ASIN=0691137943&nodeID=#wasThisHelpfulession. Ultimately, this analysis proved to be incorrect.Why the work remains a classic, even though flawed, is because the sheer difficulty in producing such a feat. Friedman and Schwartz managed to put together a comprehensive 100 year monetary history in (a short) 700 pages. The amount of research required to take on such a project is hard to grasp. The footnotes in the "Monetary History" give a small glimpse into how much work was required to create this book. They alone are the size of a mid-sized economic text. Throughout the text the authors synthesis a wide range of evidence, often being forced to recalculate the statistics given to them, and somehow come out with a fairly consistent history.The work is so encompassing it is impossible in an Amazon book review to point out all of the prescient ideas presented in a "Monetary History". Here is a short list off the top of my head: 1) money matters in the short-run; 2) active gov't policy can prevent bank panics if correctly implemented; 3) Consistent misperception regarding economics have OFTEN created bad policy (both in the private and public sphere); 4) the gold standard was never good (and we never had anything near an ACTUAL gold standard); 5) An excellent review of business cycle contractions between 1844-1960; 6)Everything you wanted to know about the composition of banking mechanisms from 1867-1960. There are many, many more...Friedman's "Monetary History" analysis does occasionally feel awkward (this tends to happen when his quantitative analysis does not account for history and he is forced to make qualitative assumptions). 1) The entire Great Contraction rested on the qualitative factor of not having a 'Great Man' running the Federal Reserve; 2) Deflation existed side by side with rapid economic expansion in the 1880's, which Friedman finds interesting, but no attempt is made to ascertain whether monetary issues had any recessionary effects on potential growth; 3) The entire 48-60' analysis exerts a strong ideological stance that did not seem to exist in the earlier chapters. (many more minor hiccups exist and for the most part Friedman is willing to admit when he cannot reasonably prove causation).However, two major problems exist in the "Monetary History".1) The assumption that money does not matter in the long-run is unsupported through their analysis. Friedman and Schwartz fail to find any long lasting effects regarding changes in the price level and money stock to changes in economic activity. This view, which is a very simple look at correlations, is essentially embracing a negation. They fail to find a connection between monetary economics and business cycles so it must not exist. Though this view has little empirical evidence it is made several times throughout the work (and in almost every case the statement seems to be completely out of place). The claim that money is 'neutral' has forever changed economics by being included in the Neoclassical Synthesis.2) Friedman's chapter on the velocity of money is by far the weakest part of his text. After going on for ~700 pages with precise attention to quantitative analysis Friedman is forced to argue, in a mere 3 pages, that changes in velocity must be due to rational expectations (with little empirical evidence). Friedman's assumption that Velocity exhibits a secular decline with rising income is CRUCIAL when analyzing Monetarism. The Quantity Theory of Money states: Money*Velocity=Price*Output --- M*V=P*Y (this is a rearrangement of Fisher's equation -- See Michael Emmett Bradely's review for a far superior theoretical analysis of this equation). If Velocity can be considered constant then changes in M = changes in P*Y. This means all that is needed to have stable business cycles is an unchanging, or better yet a slightly increasing, money supply. HOWEVER, this flawed assumption is why Monetarism is so difficult to implement into policy. Friedman's tentative assumption in his "Monetary History" became the dogma of Monetarism."A Monetary History of the US, 1867-1960" is a revolutionary, albeit flawed, canon in economic literature.

This book (and Golden Fetters) are two seminal works that, had they been read by the top economists in the nation when the Too Big to Fail catastrophe hit, might have found ways to avoid it sooner.

For the few individuals who desire a better understanding of monetary policy history of the US this is a valuable reference tool.

The quantity of the "money supply" is ultimately irrelevant, unless each and every unit of currency is scientifically defined. After all, who is redeeming so-called "dollars" and "pounds" that represent nothing? Fractional-reserve banking is an obvious violation of GAAP, science, law, and logic. Financial "banking" is a form of theft, fraud, counterfeiting, and slavery. When will today's "economists" learn how to think? Please read "Progress and Poverty" by Henry George, and examine "The Money Masters".

:)

Nn aderisce perfettamente...spesso il touch non funziona...protegge ma nn è il massimo

Excellent source material

Don't read this without an Economics dictionary. It's a very technical and at times heavy going book. It's a classic however. It brilliantly explains The Great Depression. It definitely shows , in my opinion, that monetary policy is far more important than fiscal policy. I also recommend, by Milton and Rose Friedman "Free to Choose".

Still one of the great required economics texts. Required reading for all politicians and other "policy makers" - fat chance!