Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project's Indispensable Man Hardcover – January 1, 2002

As biographer Robert Norris himself concedes, there have been many accounts of the Manhattan Project since World War II, several biographies of Leslie Groves, and even Paul Newman's memorable depiction of Groves in the film "Fat Man and Little Boy." Norris hoped to achieve the academically definitive biography, and no one can accuse him of failing at that. He is thorough. In fact, there is unintended humor in the "racing" title: as late as page 214 the search for real estate for Hanford and Oak Ridge is just getting underway. Groves's bomb has a long fuse.Leslie R. Groves entered West Point on the eve of World War I. When the United States entered the war, the Academy's curriculum was compressed into a two year matriculation in the belief that many new officers would be needed quickly on the European front. As timing would have it, neither Groves nor many of his fellow cadets saw action. What resulted, however, was a glut of peacetime officers, an undesirable situation for ambitious career officers like Groves. Eventually Groves's accomplishments would outrun his rank, a major political liability. In the end, however, Groves himself was his own worst enemy. Intelligent and self-motivated, Groves became an accomplished engineer at the Academy, though it would seem that as a cadet he acquired the skills without the polish. As an officer in the Corps of Engineers he was brusque and dogged, except with those who could advance his career. Superiors tolerated his rudeness and obesity because he could kick behinds and deliver the goods. In peacetime he might have been shuffled out; but as the Nazi shadow extended closer to home, a man of Groves's productivity would be annually disciplined for his interpersonal shortcomings and "punished" with greater responsibilities. It was thus that Groves became a major force in the construction of the Pentagon, and ultimately a secret weapons project based in the New York District of the Army Corps of Engineers, the so-called Manhattan Project.To the uninformed, Groves's contribution to the production of the atomic bomb was as scoutmaster for a collection of scientific mad monk geniuses in the desert of New Mexico. In fact, Norris leaves the impression that Groves was more of an absentee landlord at Los Alamos. The real action was going on elsewhere, primarily in massive industrial complexes at Hanford, Washington, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. In some respects the building of these two industrial facilities was as impressive as the making of the bomb. That Groves was able to build not one but two mammoth atomic factories in roughly eighteen months is staggering.As Norris tells the story, Groves enjoyed a decent relationship with Robert Oppenheimer and most of the scientists working for him. He did not totally understand the intricacies of atomic physics; in truth, the entire project was a foray into the unknown. Where he excelled was in translating theoretical problems into practical management components which he executed against incredible odds: shortages of rare substances and wartime civilian labor, secrecy and security, political and military infighting, and concern over the German nuclear program, to cite a few. When his scientists were divided over opposing theories and techniques, Groves's favorite stratagem was simply to test both possibilities in laboratory situations and select the one that worked.Which raises the question of costs and accountability. The funding of this massive secret project is probably a good subject for a separate work. Suffice to say that Groves drew his funding from an extraordinarily large but innocuously named account, and that funding was one problem he did not have to face, at least until after the war. Conveniently, there was in fact no one-certainly not his [many] senior officers-who could question the wisdom of Groves's expenditures and management techniques. He answered, nominally at least, to a civilian board appointed by Roosevelt, which included James Conant, President of Harvard. But from this narrative the board's primary relationship with Groves appeared to be running interference.After Japan's surrender, Groves exercised a proprietorship over the newly confirmed nuclear technology, and he would parcel it out sparingly and reluctantly. He advocated an American hegemony of nuclear weaponry-no international control of atomic bombs, no sharing of technology with allies-and even within America he embargoed information to most government agencies, including the White House. Groves protected the stockpile, and since the weapons were stored as component parts, Groves could obfuscate the true strategic strength of the American arsenal as political needs dictated. Norris contends that Groves forged much of this nation's current nuclear philosophy during and immediately after the Manhattan Project.New technology notwithstanding, the old politics would eventually derail Groves. In 1948, during his annual fitness review, Groves was told by Dwight Eisenhower to his face that his maverick days were over and that he would not be appointed chief of engineers. Eisenhower, who regarded Groves as a loose cannon, made it clear that too many officers had been rubbed the wrong way by his arrogance. No fool, Groves submitted his resignation and spent several years with Remington Rand in the early years of computer development.Norris depicts Groves's role in the atomic espionage trials of the 1950's in a benign light, [Gregg Herken's new work depicts the General's involvement in a darker light] and I suspect that the author's closeness to his subject made him somewhat less critical of Groves's tactics and style. Overall, this is an extremely valuable work for several reasons. "Racing for the Bomb" is a commentary on the pros and cons of national crisis management, the dilemma of giving someone enough power to get the job done without creating a dictator. There is also a message here about contemporary nuclear proliferation. Have India, Pakistan, Iraq, and North Korea mastered their own Manhattan Projects, or is nuclear proliferation simply a matter of espionage and horse-trading? One can almost hear Groves saying, "I told you so."

The book is in Great condition and arrived "ahead of schedule." Nice find!

Received a good clean former library copy of the book, and am pleased with it.

Though unavoidably long on military and governmental organizations the story here of the almost unbelievable management skills of Groves is fascinating. The Manhattan Project was massive and required the creation of all facets of science, manufacturing, security, aviation, finance, time management, construction, and Human Resources. Amazing it was carried out with ONLY Groves and his secretary knowing all the pieces. Loved this book,

I was not interested in half the book becasue it was about his personnel life and I was more interested in the development and processing the bomb and delivery system and is not really easy reading in regards to his life. I know he was not perfect, but everyone has two sides, to much of his walking on water. Repeated his goodness to many times, no one is that perfect.....

This is a well-written book covering one of the most powerful men in US history. Prior to reading Racing For The Bomb, I had a very one-dimensional view of Groves - believing him to be someone merely implementing the directions of Oppenheimer. Groves, in fact, was a well-trained engineer and ensured that The Bomb would be produced and utilized to end the war as expeditiously as he could, saving as many US and Allied lives as possible. A harsh taskmaster andexperienced construction engineer, Groves was in charge of procurement of land, men, and material, security, finance, construction of what are now the US National Labs at Oak Ridge, Hanford, and Los Alamos, shipment of the weapon to Tinian, procurement of the bombers, selection and training of the bomber crews, and selection of the targets. Definitely worth the time to read the fascinating story of the development of one of the best Army engineers in history and his pinnacle accomplishment.

This is not a "comic book" version of Groves' life and work.In places, the book emphasizes Groves MILITARY approach to building the atomic bomb, in contrast to the approach that would probably have been taken by an academic and scientific research organization.It is disappointing to read about reports emanating from eminent scientists, politicians and business leaders that Groves' personality displeased them.Were those persons who disliked Groves totally unaware that it was Groves who solely shouldered responsibility for the entire Manhattan project, and if he failed his future career would be doomed forever, and, most probably, they would be part of the mob howling at him?Worst of all, despite his leadership success, some of the super-intelligent elites persisted in their criticisms of Groves after his management style had produced successful results in the form of deliverable bombs.Anyone who has served in the military, either voluntary, or, worse still, were called up to do, knows how it can be difficult to endure a strictly hierarchical culture that demands unquestioning obedience to commands.The lack of sensitivity shown by Groves' academic and scientific colleagues to the military realities that Groves had to face reveals a flaw in their own arrogant culture.Sadly, to this day, it appears that today's popular media's historical propaganda has, once again, revised history and focussed more on spin that names a few elite scientists as being the sole creators of the atomic bomb, to the exclusion of Groves' leadership contribution and also to the efforts of the tens of thousands of unknown Manhattan project workers.