Imperial Life in The Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone Paperback – September 4, 2007

The book, "Imperial Life in the Emerald City" by Rajiv Chandrasekaran is excellent. This book chronicles the life of the CPA, Coalition Provisional Authority from start to finish. It really almost reads as a humor book if it wasn't true. The book shows how Bush's arrogance took shape in the policies of the occupation. You can sort of see why the outside world views the US as they do. The book shows how the CPA came into Iraq, told the Iraqis to bend over and then say to the Iraqis we are here to help you. A reader can see how ideology and political spoils guided policy over all else. If as a reader you don't agree with that point then the Administration comes off as dangerously naïve, incompetent, and just plain stupid.The author fills his book with scores of stories that really shows the environment that was the CPA and guided its daily actions. These stories give depth and text to the history of the CPA. Through those stories a reader can see how the arrogance of the neocons in the Bush administration blinded them to reality in almost a humorous way. Almost every page of the book reads like a Saturday Night Live skit.When the desires driven by ideology came up against the reality of the situation reality was ignored. The author shows from the start how the administration thought because they willed something it should be done. The how was immaterial. They could overrule history, culture, environment and reality because they George Bush said so. .One of the best stories to illustrate that was how they insisted that the Iraqi stock market be a carbon copy of the New York stock exchange with computers, licensed brokers and everything else. The facts of the situation like few people in the country ever touched a computer was irrelevant. This pursuit of theory was to take place over everything else. The local stock market traders offered to bring the exchange up in months if they could use the old methods. That offer was rebuffed in the interest of pursing theory, even if it meant success of a more limiting nature. The stock market never did reach that ideal state even after the US taxpayer dolled out millions in this quest. Another example was in the CPA's efforts to rebuild Iraqi Universities. They wanted to install academic freedom in parts of Iraq that still would not let women appear in public without their burkas. Then the administration starts to doll out assistance grants to US universities to help out on various academic subjects with Iraqi universities which literally did not even have buildings.Anther humorous story was in the hiring decisions of the CPA. One would think that if you were going to redesign a whole country you would bring your best and brightest. No, that wasn't the case with the CPA. Only the best connected were hired. Frequently the CPA staffers were sons and daughters of Republican contributors back home. Their stint with the CPA was their first real job out of college. Experience or education in the field didn't matter. One guy was hired whose previous work experience was driving an ice cream truck. The person in charge of designing the new stock market didn't have any job experience in the field nor a degree in business or finance.The author also brings to light the effect of environment on decision making in the CPA. The CPA flew into Baghdad with their "dreams" but it didn't reflect upon the environment. They treated it like a game they played at the international club back at Yale, not reality where people were dying every day. . Few CPA staffers would leave the coalition space called the green zone. They immersed themselves in American culture. They did not take time to understand the real environment of Iraq. Then they would try to force American solutions to Iraqi problems without even talking to the Iraqis.They totally lacked the ability to see what was happening around them. Frequently this blindness was humorous. It was almost like Baghdad Bob in reverse. The CPA would spout how life was good in Iraq because of them while fierce battles raged mere miles from where they stood. They seemed to be totally blind to how life for the average citizen in Iraq had actually grown worse under CPA rule. However they the CPA press releases would be quick to bring up some small fact like immunizations given. These press releases were given to an Iraqi public that were sitting in the dark, morning the loss of a relative, or dodging shrapnel in the streets.All of this is chronicled in the book. It is a good page turner that is easy to read. I think all would enjoy it.

This is an exceptional book about a military occupation. Having written one myself, I can tell you that it is one of the best books on a military occupation in print today. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, a former Baghdad bureau chief for the Washington Post, does an excellent job of being even-handed and fair in his coverage of American efforts to rebuild Iraq. What follows is an all too familiar story of Americans assuming that they knew better than they people of the country that they administered what was in the best interests of that nation.What is particularly impressive about this book is that Chandrasekaran has drawn upon his contacts and developed the Iraqi side of the story. He shows that neo-cons in the Bush Administration really could have gotten most of what they wanted. The Iraqis really were glad to be rid of the Sadaam Hussein, but the American failure to deliver on their rhetoric turned them off. These failures were huge like the decline in basic services like health care, electricity, and water. The insistence of Coalition Provisional Authority to try and turn Iraq into a Jeffersonian democracy on a "Shake and Bake" basis that would look just like an ideal conservative version of the United States with a market driven economy and laissez-faire government and civil liberties for all dominated thinking in the Green Zone. Evidence indicates that the Iraqis wanted a system more like the New Deal where the state was much more active in providing services and, most of all, security. The people pushing the neo-con agenda were doing so with no regard or understanding of Iraqi history or culture. In fact, most spoke no Arabic at all. The main criteria for working in the occupation was not area expertise be it in economics, health care, or electrical engineering, but being a proven supporter of the Republican Party. Closed off in their little cocoon, many honestly had no idea of how unrealistic their efforts were.Chandrasekaran focuses most of his attention on the civilians in the CPA. As a result, he does not really examine how ready the uniformed military was for the insurgency that followed the conventional phase of the war and the military basically gets something of a pass. For more on this part of the story, one should read Thomas E. Ricks' "Fiasco." Both Ricks and Chandrasekaran put a good deal of responsibility on the shoulders of the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense. Still, Chandrasekaran's gives both sides of the story even though he is clearly skeptical about the competence of many individuals. Jerry Bremer, the head of the CPA, gets his points, almost getting it right with the Kurds in the north, but only after giving the insurgency fuel with his ill-considered decision to abolish the Iraqi Army and ban all Baath party members from government service no matter how minimal their association.This book is a delight to read. It is difficult to put down. Chandrasekaran writes in a smooth fashion, even if he has a tendency to be repetitive and redundant in his word selection. Parts are hilarious. Sadly, it is all true.

This book is a fascinating read about the Green Zone and the Occupation in general. It is only somewhat about "life" in the Green Zone. Most of the book is devoted to policies and decisions of the CPA, and the personalities involved. It is impossible to tell such a story without opinions and editorializing - clearly the author believes that CPA was poorly run and the occupation was not only poorly planned but mismanaged equally in Washington and Iraq. Soldiers in the field and Iraqis seem to agree, but perhaps there is a more complicated story than the one presented in this book. Decisions at this scale are never easy to make, and policy makers have to balance a wide range of conflicting and difficult factors in the fog of war. The book essentially suggests that whatever policy the CPA didn't follow would have probably worked. This is difficult to believe; I believe in many instances the occupation was doomed to struggle and the insurgency at some significant level was almost guaranteed.Nonetheless, I highly recommend this book. It is a great mix of human stories, policy discussions, and anecdotes. It is a real page turner, without the momentum of battle to push it. If I have one substantive complaint - it's too short! Many subjects were touched upon but never resolved, such as what happened to the Assyrian gold.Ironically, the war has been largely won and Iraq is almost a better country today than it was in 2002 or even 1991. Critics of the 2003 war seem to ignore the challenges of the Saddam regime and his rogue activities. But, as was repeated several times in this book, the war may have been won in spite of the CPA rather than thanks to it.