Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45

The hardcover edition of this book was published in 1965, with an author's forward for the reprinted version in 1985. Despite the archival resources that the author didn't have access to in 1965, his research efforts and literary skills bring Operation Barbarossa to life.The description that the author provides on the relationships between Hitler and his generals contributes to the doom that befell the Germans during a campaign that was massive in scale and depth. The euphoria that spellbound the German army after their successful invasions of Poland and France would not apply to the war on the Eastern Front.We learn about the resentment and maneuvering that occurred within the German High Command and the inner circle of Adolf Hitler. Even before the invasion of Russia, the mistrust that plagued the command structure of the German army played out in power struggles that contributed to the demise of Barbarossa.The author accesses the map rooms of Adolf Hitler and we witness the slow mental and physical decline of the leader who said that the "world will hold its breath" when the German army invaded Russia. We see the mistakes that German leadership made prior to the invasion: 1) underestimating Red Army forces; 2) difficulties with logistics and supplies; 3) a limited understanding of history on the part of Adolf Hitler; 4) poor intelligence concerning Russia strength; 5) a lack of winter clothing; 5) wider gauged railroad tracks in Russia than in Germany; 6) Hitler's claim that just kicking in the door will cause the" entire rotten structure of Russia to come crashing down." The German Army was confronted by an opponent of a completely different kind from those in the West; it failed to appreciate that the Russian soldier "loves a fight and scorns death."This information sets the stage before German tanks and guns began firing across the Russian border. The early days of the invasion resemble those of Poland and France, but the German Army quickly learns that the resistance of the Russian soldier is so intense that some believe they have killed the same man twice. The summer successes that the German Army experiences with victories at Mink and Smolensk contribute to the false belief that the campaign will end in months. The intoxicating momentum that drives the German Army comes to a grinding halt when Hitler decided to attack Leningrad and Kiev instead of Moscow. His decision to divide the strength of Army Group Center - and postpone a full assault on Moscow before the rains and winter set in - does not bode well for the German Army.If you like World War Two history, please consider having this book on your shelf. The details that it provides on Operation Typhoon (the Batlle of Moscow) as well as the deathtrap of Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk will not disappoint. You will be introduced to Guderian and Manstein on the German side and to Zhukov, Chuikov, and Timoshenko on the Russian side. The last chapter concerns the final, ill-fated efforts that the German Army made to slow the Russian forces that head to Berlin. This book provides the foundation and inspiration for other authors to write about a very important part of miliaty history.

I love this book. Others have done a fantastic job of describing its pros and its cons (yes, there are a few flaws). But the reason I consider this book to be THE DEFINITIVE WORK on the Eastern Front during WWII is because Alan Clark, a Western historian, boldly declared in 1964, in the middle of the Cold War, the following (hereafter an excerpt from Clark's Preface, p. xxi):"From this study is one left with any general conclusions? I believe the answer is yes, but they are not of a kind from which we in the West can derive much comfort. It does seem that the Russians could have won the war on their own, or at least fought the Germans to a standstill, without any help from the West. Such relief as they derived from our participation - the distraction of a few enemy units, the supply of a large quantity of material - was marginal, not critical. That is to say, it affected the duration but not the outcome of the struggle. It is true that once the Allies had landed in Normandy the drawing-off of reserves assumed critical proportions. But the threat, much less the reality, of a 'second front' became a factor only after the real crisis in the East had passed."Writing this in 1964 took a lot of courage. And it speaks to why this book is such a worthy read for anyone studying World War Two - the author obviously has made sincere and fervent attempts to speak the truth as much as he could perceive it, which in the final analysis is the duty of all true historians.

There has been a lot of scholarship since this was first published in 1965 (updated in the mid-70s I think), but this still stands the test of time and is probably the most readable account available. Glantz goes way way too deep, and other authors base themselves on new interpretations (Stahel) — all good and very worthwhile — but I keep coming back to Clark for the clarity and coherence of the story. Clark, like most, glosses over the underlying evil that marked the purpose of the campaign, and the sidesteps the unpardonable conduct (holocaust, prisoners, reprisals) and the absolute complicity of the senior officers who claimed no knowledge. But that is par for most eastern campaign narratives, and only a few authors have heroically tackled those issues.

I read this cover-to-cover. I'm not a newbie to WW2 history. I've read William Shirer's "Rise and Fall"three times in my life. There are historians who "know how to write/know how to teach". There are historians who "know their stuff but don't communicate it well for the common man (me)". Of course, on the other hand , there are writers who can come up with a great story, but don't know a thing about the facts. Alan Clark taught me PLENTY in this book. Specifically, I had become aware (from other reading) that the "real WW2" was fought between '41 and '45 on the Eastern Front. The Western Allies surely did hasten the fall of the Nazi regime, but the real bulk of damage done to the Nazis was done by Russia - at GREAT COST to all. Alan Clark's volume satisfied my desire to learn. But...but...but the book could have been made SO much better with the addition of meaningful maps. The maps provided just don't cut it. You've got to remember that we Westerners may know a little bit about European geography, but NOTHING about that vast territory known as "Russia". Many times the narrative had place-names that were not on the maps. If there is ever another edition done to this book by the publisher, they will be well-advised to totally take another approach to the maps. ALSO....... names - German and Russian - are thrown into the text as if we "know or remember who these people are". Plenty of facts, but just not well-presented for the common Joe.

Covers a huge subject area, the most titanic struggle of WW2. Although most of the major 1941-45 battles on the eastern front are covered, focus is also on the German operations, failings, in-fighting and ultimate reasons for defeat.However, after Stalingrad there is no mention of Army Group North and Leningrad, or Army Group Centre and Moscow-Smolensk II. The focus is entirely on the collapsing southern front. The final battle for Berlin is lightly covered.Not enough detailed maps, and no translations of comments in German.Overall however, a great introduction and analysis to a riveting struggle.

Being aware that this book is no 30/40 years old, I decided to read Alan Clark's work on this atrocious conflict that involved two of the most powerful war machines of this century.The book has good reviews and offers a perfect overview to the gigantic subject.The narration is fluid and the chapter division quite helpful.More importantly, the author keeps away from overdescription of unit positions, movements of troops, etc. which can blur the vision sometimes. This is especially true for a campaign like Barbarossa.Its is quite often that military history authors lacking politic and economic knowledge prefers to concentrate on purely militaristic matters.However, I had a really good time reading the book but was quite dissapointed and would say frustrated that the book was very light on:- The Leningrad siege- The battle for Berlin- The role of the luftwaffe and the war in the airDespite the above, there are some really brillant parts such as the Stalingrad chapters, or the addition of recorded dialogues between Hitler and his staff, or personal accounts such as the 2 ou 3 pages long account of the russian sniper.Finally, I recomend the reading of Guderian's book "Panzer Leader" which presents the conflict through the eye of the famous tank theorist and leader.

The struggle of the Soviet Union with the invasion by Nazi germany in 1941. The battles to decided the outcome of the second world war. Well written, lots of details, the changing structure of the german army from its invasion, to its avoidable disaster at stalingrade. The biggest war in history.

I did not realise the author was Alan Clark (sadly decd, politician) This is a well written book and whilst I am still slowly working through it I am am enjoying it all, Even though I have read many more up to date works on the 41/45 conflict in Russia which had access to Russian archives. So if you are interested read.

A memorable account which explains very well the military and wider history of this conflict. The secret of its success is, in my view, the authors narration which gives the impression of having been spent alot of time on. I found the scenes particularly fitting such as the first scene on a dreary Sunday to the choice of letters and photos which tell alot of the awful drama those actually in the battle faced. This book is deserving of big recognition I think.